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PREFACE 
This thesis consists of three papers: In the first paper, alternative approaches of using Monte 
Carlo methods to implement a Cox-typetest for nonnested hypotheses are considered. These 
. . . 
approaches are due to Pesaran and Pesaran and Lee and Brorsen. Pesaran and Pesaran's test 
. . 
is an asymptotic test. Lee and Brorsen's test is a Monte Carlo test, but it is not based on a 
pivotal statistic. An alternative Cox-type test based on an asymptotically pivotal statistic is 
. . . 
proposed. This test is a Monte Carlo test. The finite sample performances of the three. are 
compared. In the second paper, principal-agent models are developed to determine optimal 
. . 
price slides. for feeder cattle sold through video auctions. The third paper aimed. to determine 
why past studies. on· the effectiveness of generic meat advertising have reached conflicting 
conclusions. 
I would like to sincerely thank my major advisor, Dr B. Wade Brorsen, for his 
patience and intelligent guidance. I wish to express my gratitude to my other advisory 
committee members, Drs. Dan Tilley, Shida Henneberry, and Lee Adkins for their useful 
comments. To my family and friends who encouraged me throughout my studies, thank you 
fot your invaluable support. 
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A MONTE CARLO SAMPLING APPROACH TO TESTING NONNESTED 
HYPOTHESES: MONTE CARLO RESULTS 
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A MONTE CARLO SAMPLING APPROACH TO TESTING NONNESTED 
HYPOTHESES: MONTE CARLO RESULTS 
ABSTRACT 
Alternative ways of using Monte. Carlo methods to. implement a Cox-type test for nonnested 
hypotheses are considered. Monte Carlo experiments are designed to compare the finite . 
sample performances. of a new Monte Carlo test based on an asymptotically pivotal statistic 
with Pesaran and Pesaran's test and a Monte Carlo test previously proposed by Lee and 
Brorsen. The Monte Carlo resul~s provide strong evidence that the size of the Pesaran and 
Pesaran test is generally incorrect, except for very large sample sizes. All the tests have 
excellent power. The two Monte Carlo tests perform equally well for all sample sizes and are 
both clearly preferred to the Pesaran and Pesaran test, even in large samples. 
Key Words and Phrases: Cox test; Monte Carlo test; nonnested hypotheses 
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A MONTE CARLO SAMPLING APPROACH TO TESTING NONNESTED 
HYPOTHESES: MONTE CARLO RESULTS 
1. Introduction 
The Cox statistic for testing nonnested hypotheses is the difference between the log 
likelihood ratio and its expected value under the null. While the log likelihood ratio is 
straightforward.to obtain, the computation of its expected value is often intractable (Cox, 
1962; Pesaran and Pesaran, 1993). Thus, a number of Cox-type tests that are easier to 
compute have bee11 p;oposed in the econometric literature (e.g., Pesaran, 1974; Pesaran and. 
Deaton, 1978; Aneuryn-Evans and Deaton, 1980). These tests, however, were developed for 
specific problems. 
Simulation approaches to conducting Cox's test that are applicable to many problems 
have also been proposed. One approach, due to Pesaran and Pesaran (1993; 1995), uses 
stochastic simulation to calculate the numerator of the Cox test statistic. A second approach 
. to conducting Cox's test is to use Monte Carlo hypothesis testing procedures based on the 
log-likeliho~d ratio statistic. Cox-type tests using this approach have been developed by ·. 
Williams (1970}and Lee and Brorsen(1994). Of these two Monte Carlo tests, only Lee and 
. . 
Brorsen test is based on the Monte Carlo hypothesis testing procedures suggested by Noreen 
(1989) and Hall and Titterington (1989). These procedures allow directly computing the 
significance level (p-value) of the test. statistic being used. In Noreen, the parameters under 
the null are assumed known. Noreen (1989) proves that in this case, Monte Carlo tests are 
3 
valid in small samples. Hall and Titterington (1989) discuss the case where the parameters 
under the null are unknown and must be replaced by consistent estimates. They show that 
Monte Carlo tests under these circumstances are asymptotically valid, but still have excellent 
power and size properties. 
Since introduced by Barnard (1963), Monte Carlo tests have received considerable 
attention. To conduct a Monte Carlo test, one must start by specifying an appropriate test 
statistic for the hypothesis ofinterest (Barnard, 1963; Hope, 1968). The value of the test 
statistic is calculated for the actual data under the null hypothesis. The test procedure then 
consists of generating random samples under the .null hypothesis and comparing the value of 
the test statistic for each simulated sample to its value for the actual data. A p-value can be 
obtained directly by calculating the percentage (with a slight adjustment) of the simulated test 
statistics which are greater or smaller (depending on the rejection criterion) than the value of 
the test statistic computed with the actual data (Noreen, 1989; Hope, 1968). 
Monte Carlo tests are very useful when the distribution of the test statistic is unknown 
or difficult to obtain analytically (Hope, 1968; Noreen, 1989). Monte Carlo tests have 
excellent size and power properties (Hall and Titterington, 1989; Hope, 1968). In particular, 
a Monte Carlo test that is based on an asymptotically pivotal statistic has better size 
properties than the corresponding asymptotic test (Hall and Titterington, 1989). Hope (1968) 
showed that Monte Carlo tests have powers that are very close to those of most uniformly 
powerful tests provided that sufficient random samples are used and there are no nuisance 
parameters. Hall and Titterington proved that the excellent power properties of Monte Carlo 
tests hold even if the test statistic used is not asymptotically pivotal, but the same is not true 
4 
for the size properties. 
The log-likelihood ratio statistic used in previous Monte Carlo tests is not 
asymptotically pivotal. Indeed, its distribution under the null depends on unknown 
parameters. An. alternative Cox-type test is proposed here. This test uses Monte Carlo 
hypothesis testing procedures based on an asymptotically pivotal statistic. As mentioned 
. . . 
. . 
above, pivotalness guarantees that Monte Carlq tests have better size properties than 
asymptotic tests. Pesaran and Pesaran (1993) ·also argued that a Monte Carlo test based on 
the log-likeHhood ratid "may not' have satisfactory asymptotic properties in the case of 
nonnested models where the log-likelihood ratio is not centered even in large samples" (p. 
378). Past research using th~ log-likelihood ratio statistic in a Monte Carlo test has not 
' . . . . 
addressed this issue. Monte Carlo experiments are used here to compare the finite sample 
performances of the Monte Carlo test proposed here with the one suggested by Lee and 
Brorsen (1994)and the asymptotic test developed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1993; 1995). 
2. Cox's Test 
Consider the following two nonnested hypotheses: 
(1) 
(2) 
where y is a T x 1 vector of dependent variables, x and z are T x ~ + 1) and T x (K.1 + 1) 
5 
matrices of independent variables, e O and e 1 are unknown vectors of parameters, f and 
g. are density functions, K0 and K1 are the number of independent variables 
under H0 and H1, respectively, and Tis the number of observations. For the test of the 
null hypothesis Ho against Hi, Cox (1961; 1962) proposed the following test statistic: · 
(3) 
· likelihoods under Ho and 1 H , respectively, Eo(L01) is the expected value 
of Eo(L01). under H0, . and e O and . e 1 are the maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
of the null and the alternative mode~ respectively. TO is asymptotically distributed with mean 
' ' ; . 
zero and variance v; under Ho (Cox, 1962). For the test ofH1 against Ho, the test statistic 
would be T1 = L10 - E(L10). The notation used here corresponds to the test of Ho against 
3. Pesaran and Pesaran and Lee and Brorsen Test Procedures 
Pesaran and Pesaran's test {PP) 
· The Cox test statistic in equation (3) is difficult to apply in practice because a closed 
form cannot always be found for the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio. Pesaran and 
Pesaran (1993; 1995) proposed computing the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio 
using simulation procedures. In this approach, the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio 
is approximated by the Kullback-Leibler measure of closeness of Ho with respect to H1 defined 
6 
as: 
where ·. c { e O, e ~ ) is the closeness measure of Ho with respect to Hi, e ~ is the probability · 
limit of E\ under Ho and 8 ~ is a function of 8 O • Then, letting C { 8 O, 8; ) be an 
estimator of . c; { e O, e ~ ) under Ho, the standardized · Cox statistic for 
. . 
· testing H0 against H1 is obtained as (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1993; 1995): 
'{ii[L01 - C{801 e;)] 
Jv; (80 ; · e;). ' (5) 
where vt {80 , e;) is a consistent estimate of the asymptotic vanance 
of {n [ L 01 - .C { 8 0 , 8; ) ] , and 8; is a consistent estimator of 8 ~ under lfo. 
Analytical derivation of. C { 8 0 , 8; ) is generally not possible (Pesaran and Pesaran, 
1993). It can, however, be computed using Monte Carlo integration as follows. Generate 
R random samples using the estimator. 80 under Ifo. Denoting 91 j as the parameter 
estimates of the alternative. model obtained from the l11. Monte Carlo sample, a consistent 
estimator of. e; is given by: 
(6) 
This estimator depends on the number of random samples R. It approaches e ~ (which is 
a function of e O) as R increases (see Pesaran and Pesaran, 1995). The simulation estimator 
of the closeness measure, CR {80 , e; {R)), is then obtained as: 
7 
(7) 
where L 0 (8 0 , yj) and L 1 (8~(R), Y) arethelog-likelihoodsevaluatedwiththejl11 
random sample under Ho and&, respectively, and 80 and 8; (R) are treated as fixed 
(Pesaran and Pesaran, 1993). Note that yj is the jth vector of the T artificially generated 
observations on the dependent variable y. 
Pesaran and Pesaran {1995) discussed three asymptotically equivalent methods for 
computing· v;. The first method uses the "inner-product" expression for the information 
matrix (see Pesaran and Pesaran, 1993). In this case, the variance can be obtained by 
regressing dt = L0 (8 0 , yt) - L 1 (81 , yt), the log-likelihood ratio for the tlh 
observation (here, y1 is the tlh observation on y, i.e., Yi is a scalar), on a constant and the first 
derivativesof L0t(80, yt) withrespectto 80 (Cox, 1962;PesaranandPesaran, 1993; 
1995). The sum of squared error of this regression is the estimate of the asymptotic variance 
of Cox tesi. Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) suggested using the simulation estimator 8; ( R) to 
compute di rather than 81 • The variance obtained using the inner product expression of the 
infor:rnation_ matrix and the simulation estimator e; ( R) will be referred to as v;0 • The 
second method uses the "outer""product" expression for the information matrix. Unlike the 
. ' . 
first method, the second method often yields negative values for the variance (Pesaran and 
Pesaran, 1993; 1995). Thus, the second method will not be used here. In the third method, 
the variance is simply computed as (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1995): 
8 
T 
~o = 
I: (dt - ci) 2 
t=l (8) 
T - 1 
where, as before, di is computed using the estimators ( 8 0 , 8; ( R) ) , d is the mean of 
di, and T is the number of observations. 
The simulation estimatorofthe Cox statistic,. S0 ( 80 , 81 ) , 1s: 
(9) 
where To(R) = LOl - CR(eo, e;(R)) under Ho. vJo could also be used in the 
denominator of So(R). So(R) is asymptotically distributed as N(O, 1) under Ho (Pesaran and 
Pesaran, 1993). 
The measure of closeness used by Pesaran and Pesaran has proved very useful in 
statistical inferences (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995; White, 1994). Its use in Pesaran and 
Pesaran's test procedure greatly simplifies computing T0. However, it may not well 
approximate the true expected value of the log-likelihood ratio since 8 0 and 8; ( R) are 
considered as given when computing CR ( 8 Or 8; ( R) ) • 
Lee and Brorsen's Test 
As in Williams (1970), the Monte Carlo test proposed by Lee and Brorsen (1994) to 
discriminate among separate families of hypotheses uses the log-likelihood ratio as the test 
statistic. With theLee and Brorsen's test (MC(LB)), the null hypothesis would be rejected 
9 
if the actual value ofL01 is less than its corresponding simulated value an unexpectedly small 
number of times. Thus, using Noreen's approach, the significance level of the test is 
calculated as (see Noreen, 1989; Hall and Titterington, 1989): 
p-value 
= (numb[ (L0 j - L 1 j) :;; L 01 ] +1) 
1 R + 1 
(10) 
where numb[] means the number of elements of the set for which the specified relationship 
is true. The test is appealing because it is simple to calculate. 
4. An Alternative Test Procedure 
An alternative Cox-type test is proposed in this section. The test is implemented using 
the Monte Carlo hypothesis testing procedures suggested by Noreen (1989) and Hall and 
Titterington (1989). With MC(LB), the log-likelihood ratio is used as the test statistic, but 
here we use a test statistic similar to that of Pesaran and Pesaran (1993; 1995). The test 
statistic is.obtained as the ratio of {ii.T0 to the square root of its variance vi.· Unlike 
MC(LB ), . this test statistic is asymptotically pivotal. The variance can be computed using any 
of the methods discussed above. However, the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio is 
computed differently from Pesaran and Pesaran (1993; 1995). 
The expected value ofL01 under Ho is calculated by simulation as follows: 
(11) 
10 
of 8 0 for the· j1'1 random sample, and all other parameters and variables are defined as 
previously. Note that, contrary to Pesaran and Pesaran, the parameter estimates used here 
to calculate the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio are not treated as fixed. The 
R 
simulation estimator, R -IL LOlJ' converges to Eo(Lo1) at eOj = eOj as the number of 
j=l 
random samples R and the number of observation T increase. Under Ho, the standardized 
Cox test statistic (ST) for the actual data can be consistently estimated as: 
NT V v no 
(12) 
ST O can be computed using vJ0 as well. 
Once the value of the test statistic for the actual data is computed (i.e., ST0), to 
implement the Monte . Carlo test, the corresponding values of the test statistic for the 
simulated data are needed. Consider the j111 random sample generated using e O under Ho and 
let ST0j represents the standardized Cox test statistic for that sample. The computation of 
STOj requires the log-likelihood ratio for the jth sample, L01j, its expected value, E(L01), and 
a simulation estimator of the variance vt . The value of L01j is already known and the 
variance can be easily computed without further simulations. However, further simulations 
must be carried out in order to compute the expected value ofLoij· We proceed as follows. 
Under H0 , R random samples are generated using the estimator e0j. Let yji be the ith 
random sample thus generated. For this sample, the log-fikelihood ratio 
likelihood parameter estimates under H0 and H1, respectively. After repeating this 
11 
process R times, the expected value ofL01j can be estimated as: 
(13) 
Then, ST Oj is given by: 
(14) 
R values ofSTQi are computed and the p-value of the Cox test is obtained as (Noreen, 1989; 
Hall and Titterington, 1989): 
numb [ ST01. ~ ST0 ] + 1 p-value = 
R + 1 
(15) 
Note that boththe PP and ST tests use Monte Carlo simulations to compute the 
expected values of the log-likelihood ratios for each test. However, there is a fundamental 
difference between these two.versions of the Cox test. ST uses Monte Carlo hypothesis 
testing procedures while PP relies on asymptotic. test procedures. Thtis; ST should have 
better finite sample properties than PP. Moreover, since ST does not treat the parameter 
estimates as fixed when computing the expected value of the loglikelihood ratio, it should be 
closer to the actual Cox's test statistic than PP. 
5. Monte Carlo Experiments 
The Monte Carlo experiments are conducted using data from a real world problem. 
12 
The design matrix contains weekly data on hamburger prices and advertising expenditures. 
These data are taken from Griffiths, Hill, and Judge (pp. 295). The following two nonnested 
models are considered: 
(16) 
(17) 
where trtisweekly hamburger chain's total receipts, Pt is price, ~ is advertising expenditures, 
and the e/ s are normally distributed with zero means and constant variances. These two 
functional forms closely approximate each other. All the tests have such excellent power that 
we purposely selected a case where it would be difficult to discriminate among· the two 
hypotheses. 
When the semi-logarithmic model is the true model (Ho), the dependent variable is 
generated according to: 
trt = 82.514 + 24.84llog(at) - 21.509log(pt) + eo. (18) 
When the log-linear model is true (H1), log(trJ is generated as: 
(19) 
The parameter estimates of these data generating processes are obtained usmg 78 
observations on trt, ~' and Pt· Both~ and~ are generated using the RNDN command of 
GAUSS and standard deviations 0 0 = (2.327, 6.984) and o1 = (0.020, 0.055), respectively. 
13 
Note that 6.984 and 0.055 are the actual estimates of the standard deviations of the error 
terms under H0 and H 1, respectively. The standard deviations are varied to determine the 
effects of the variances on the Monte Carlo results. A different seed is used only when a0 and 
0 1 are varied. 
The experiments are conducted using samples of 20, 50, 100, and 200 observations. 
· The design matrix is duplicated when the samples of I 00 and 200 observations are used. The 
number of replications is 1000 for ~ples sizes 20 and 50, and 500 for samples sizes I 00 and 
200. For Pesaran and Pesaran test procedure, the measure of closeness is calculated using 
I 00 random samples. . The number of random samples (R) used in the Monte Carlo tests is 
99. Conducting the experiments with larger numbers of random samples did not substantially 
change the conclusions. 
Both the inner product and the simplified versions of the variance are used for the 
Pesaran and Pesaran and the ST tests. The maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates e0 j and e1 j are used to calculate the variances of the test statistics for the 
simulated data. The variances of the test statistics for the actual data are calculated like in 
Pesaran and Pesaran. The log-likelihood :functions of the log-linear model include the 
Jacobian terms. 
6. Monte Carlo Results 
The sizes and powers of the Pesaran and Pesaran (PP) test, MC(LB), and ST are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2 along with their standard errors in parentheses. The standard 
14 
errors were obtained as the square root ofN·1a(l - a), where N is the number of replications 
and a is the estimated size or power. The nominal significance level selected is 0.05. 
All of the tests have high power, which make them good candidates for discriminating 
among nonnested regression models. There is, however, a clear difference between the sizes 
of the Monte Carlo tests and the PP test. Consider the case where the inner product for the 
information matrix is used to calculate the variance of the Cox test. The size of the PP test 
is too high, except for samples of sizes lOO and 200 in table 2. Pesaran and Pesaran (1995) 
found similar results: Similarly, when the simplified version of the variance is used, the PP 
test over-rejects for all sample sizes but sample size 200 in table 1. In table 2, the size of the 
PP test is also incorrect in small samples, but sometimes the PP test under-rejects. 
As expected, ST has correct size for all samples, .irrespective of which version of the 
. . 
variance is used. Interestingly, the MC(LB) test also has correct size for all samples. The 
excellent size properties of the MC(LB) test could not be guaranteed a priori (even though 
it is a Monte Carlo test) since the log-likelihood ratio is not an asymptotically pivotal statistic. 
Contrary to Pesaran and Pesaran's argument, the Monte Carlo results reported here show that 
the MC(LB) test also has good asymptotic properties. 
The ST and MC(LB)tests have very similar powers for all sample sizes. Since the PP 
test tends to reject too often, it is not surprising that it often has the largest power. In the few 
cases that the size of the PP test is correct, its power is roughly equal to the powers of the ST 
and MC(LB) tests. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has determined the finite sample perfonnances of three simulated Cox-type 
tests. The first test is not a true Monte Carlo test and is due to Pesaran and Pesaran. It uses 
stochastic simulation to compute the numerator of the Cox test statistic .and tests are 
· conducted based on asymptotic normality, The second test uses Monte Carlo hypothesis 
testir{g procedures to discriminate between two separate families of hypotheses. In this 
approach, the log-likelihood ratio is considered as the test statistic. The third Cox-type test 
. is a new Monte Carlo test .. Unlike the second test, however, the test statistic used in the third 
approach is asymptotically pivotal. Pivotalness assures that the excellent size properties of 
Monte Carlo tests hold. 
. . 
The results ofthe Monte Carlo experiments show that, in general, the Pesaran and 
Pesaran test has incorrect size. As expected, the test proposed here ha:s excellent size 
properties for all sample sizes, irrespective .of which version of the variance is being used. 
Interestingly, the Monte Carlo test based on the log-likelihood ratio also has excellent size 
· and power properties for all sample sizes, even though the log-likelihood ratio statistic is not 
asymptotically pivotal. 
On the basis of their sizes, the Monte Carlo tests are clearly preferred to the Pesaran 
. . 
and Pesaran test. When the size of the Pesiiran and Pesa.tan test is correct, its power is close 
or even equal to the powers of the Monte Carlo tests. Thus, we would recommend against 
using the Pesaran and Pesaran test. The Monte Carlo tests (ST and MC(LB)) have similar 
powers. The MC(LB) test is by far the simplest to compute and therefore we recommend 
16 
that it be used in applied work. 
17 
Table 1. Monte Carlo Results. The Semi-logarithmic Model (H0) is the True Model. 
The Log-Linear Model is the Alternative Model. 
Oo = 2.327 Oo = 6.984 
Sample 
Size Test ·Size Power Size Power 
20 PP1 0.121 * (0:010) 0.657 (0.015) 0.172* (0.012) 0.375 (0,015) 
PP2 0.144* {0,011) 0.738 (0.014) 0.203* {0.012) 0.421 (0.016) 
ST1 0.042 (0.006) 0.487 (0.016) 0.039 (0.006) 0.181 (0.012) 
ST2 0.057 (0.007) ·0.569 .· (0.016) 0.043 (0.012) 0.246 (0.015) 
MC(LB) 0.059 (0.007) 0.529 (0.016) . 0.056 {0.007) 0.239 (0.013) 
50 PP1 0.098* (0.009) 0.935 (0,008) 0.138* (0.011) 0.537 (0.016) 
PP2 0.140* (0.011) 0.953 (0.007) 0.161 * (0.012) 0.615 (0.015) 
ST1 0.052 (0.007) · 0.892 (0.010) 0.042 (0.006) 0.404 (0.016) 
ST2 . 0.073 (0.008) 0.936 . (0.008) 0.053 {0.007) 0.474 (0.016) 
MC(LB) 0.047 (0.007) 0.946 (0.007) 0.054 (0.007) 0.519 (0.016) 
100 PP1 · 0.080* (0.012) 0,998 (0.002) 0.116* (0.014) 0.726 (0.020) 
PP2 0.104* (0.014) LOOO (0.000) 0.142* (0.017) 0.790 {0.018) 
ST1 0.052 (0.010) 0.9~8 (0.002) 0.046 (0.009) 0.708 (0.020) 
ST2 0.058 (0.010) 0.998 {0.002) 0.052 {0.010) 0.782 {0.018) 
MC(LB) 0.050 (0.010) 0.996 (0.003) 0.062 (0.011) 0.774 (0.019) 
200 PP1 0.070 (0.011) 1.000 (0.000) 0.084* (0.012) 0.946 (0.010) 
PP2 0.082* (0.012) 1.000 · (0.000) · 0.102* (0.014) 0.960 {0.009) 
ST1 0.052 (0.010) 1.000 (0.000) 0.056 {0.010) 0.928 {0.012) 
ST2 0.062 (0.011) 1.000 (0.000) 0.068 (0.011) 0.944 (0.010) 
. MC(LB) 0.054 . (0.010) 1.000 . (0.000) 0.064 (0.011) 0.946 (0.010) 
Note: An asterisk means the estimated size is significantly different from 0.05. Subscripts -
1 and 2 refer to the inner product and simplified versions of the variance, respectively. 
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Table 2. Monte Carlo Results. The Log-linear Model (H1) is the True Model. The 
Semi-Logarithmic Model is the Alternative Model. 
0'1 = 0.020 0'1 = 0.055 
Sample 
Size Test Size Power Size Power 
20 PP1 0.108* (0.010) 0.608 (0.015) 0.117* (0.010) 0.441 (0.016) 
PP2 0.137* (0.011) 0.674 (0.015) 0.152* (0.011) 0.503 (0.016) 
ST1 0.044 · (0.006) 0.372 (0.015) 0.040 (0.006) 0.161 (0.012) 
ST2 0:053 (0.007) 0.442 (0.016) 0,050 (0.007) 0.201 (0.013) 
MC(LB) 0.059 (0.007) 0.439 (0.016) 0.058 (0.007) 0.180 (0.012) 
50 PP1 0.053 . (0.007) 0.936 (0.008) 0.075* (0.008) 0.630 (0.015) 
PP2 0.082* (0.009) . 0.958 (0.006) 0.095* (0.010) 0.698 (0.015) 
ST1 0.051 (0.007) · 0.853 (0.011). 0.049 (0.007) 0.353 (0.015) 
ST2 0.062 (0.007) 0.893 (0.010) . 0.057 (0.007) 0.425 (0.016) 
MC(LB) 0.044 (0.006) 0.897 (0.010) 0.047 (0.007) 0.445 (0.016) 
100 PP1 0.036 (0.008) 0.996 (0.003) 0.056 (0.010) 0.858 (0.016) 
PP2 0.052 (0.010) 0.998 (0.002) 0.074 (0.012) 0.886 (0.014) 
ST1 0.056 . (0.010) ·0.994 (0.003) 0.062 (0;011) 0.648 (0.021) 
ST2 0.062 (0.011) · 0.996 (0.003) 0.072 (0.012) 0.696 (0.021) 
MC(LB) 0.058 (0.010) 0.996 (0.003) 0.056 (0.010) 0.722 (0.020) 
200 PP1 0.034* (0.008) 1.000 (0.000) 0.058 (0.010) 0.974 (0.007) 
PP2 0.042 (0.009) 1.000 (0.000) 0.064 (0.011) 0.976 (0.007) 
ST1 0.058 . (0.010) 1.000 (0.000) 0.060 (0.011) 0.932 (0.011) 
ST2 0.062 (0.011) 1.000 (0.000) 0.058 (0.010) 0.958 (0.009) 
MC(LB) 0.054 (0.010) 1.000 (0.000) 0.040 (0.009) 0.936 (0.011) 
Note: An asterisk means the estimated size is significantly different from 0.05. Subscripts 
· 1 and 2 refer to the inner product and. simplified versions of the variance, respectively. 
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OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR FEEDER CA TILE UNDER ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION 
ABSTRACT 
Twa. models are developed to explain the process of determining optimal contracts. for feeder 
cattle soldthrough video auctions or by private treaties. The two models are based on 
principal-agent theory. The first model is a risk-sharing model which is consistent with the 
current practice of arbitrarily selecting the price slide and the base weight. The predictions 
. of this model are consistent with actual behavior. However, the optimal risk-sharing contract 
is shown to be inefficient in solving the incentive· problem inherent in the feeder cattle 
contractual arrangement. Feeder cattle sellers' estimates of contract weights are biased. The 
second model is a risk-sharing and incentives model. This model is used to determine the 
optimal values of the price slide, the base weight, and the contract price. Time to delivery has 
a positive effect on the price slide and the contract price. Bailey and Holmgren' s hypothesis 
that buyers may receive higher contract prices if they are confident in their estimates of 
average delivery weights does not hol~. Sellers should set the price slides at least greater than 
the market discounts. 
Key Words: asymmetric information, feeder cattle, moral hazard, price slide, principal/agent 
theory 
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OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR FEEDER CATTLE UNDER ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION 
The number of cattle sold through Superior Livestock A~ction has rapidly increased over the 
last few years. In 1987~ over 270,000 cattle were sold by the Superior Livestock Auction. 
This number more than doubles in 1990; over 760,000 cattle were sold (Bailey and Peterson; 
Bailey etal., 1991). Superior Livestock Auction currently sells more cattle than any other 
cattle auction in the U.S. (Bailey et al.). 
Feeder cattle sold through video auctions and·by private treaty are often for future 
delivery. Because delivery weights are not known at the time of contractual arrangements, 
sellers must estiinate them. Since sellers and buyers have asymmetric information about 
weight risk, contracts need to·be·structuted to provide sellers with an incentive to estimate 
and report weights honestly. The contract must also provide an incentive for sellers to not 
excessively feed cattle. 
The usual approach to dealing with weight risk is to adjust the original contract price 
by a "price slide." The price slide is used to discount the original contract price if the actual 
average delivered weight is greater than a limit specified in advance by the seller. No 
adjustment is made to the original contract price if delivered cattle weigh less than the 
specified limit. Suppose, for 'example, that a producer's ~sti~ate of average delivered weight 
is 500 lbs. The producer could sell his cattle at $70/cwt. with a price slide of 10¢/cwt. for 
each pound of actual average weight over 520 lbs. If at delivery cattle average weight is 530 
lbs, then $I/cwt (10¢ times 10 lbs.) is deducted from the original contract price, i.e., from the 
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$70/cwt. If, however, actual average weight is 515 lbs., no adjustment is made from the 
original contract price. 
The optimal way. of determining the contract price and the price slide is poorly 
understood. Very often, video auction representatives select .a price slide based on their 
personal assessment of weight risk. Buyers may also select a price slide based on their 
experience; In either case, the price slide used may not be optimal. Bailey, Brorsen, and 
. Fawson found the surprising. result. that time to delivery has a positive effect on prices at 
Superior Livestock Auction (SLA). Other empirical studies on cash forward contracting have 
consistently found that forward contract prices. decrease as time to delivery increases ( e.g., 
Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson~ Elam). We argue that the positive relationship between 
time to delivery and the contract price is due to the implicit option created by the price slide. 
Bailey and Holmgren argued that sellers may obtain higher contract price offers if they select 
small allowable weight differences and large price slides.1 Although plausible, this hypothesis 
has yet to be tested. 
The objective of this paper is to explain the process of determining optimal contracts 
· for feeder cattle: Two models are developed using principal-agent theory. · In the first model, 
the price slide and the estimated cattle delivery weight ( or base weight) are held fixed. The 
buyer choo~s the contract price to maximize expected utility subject to the seller accepting 
the contract (i.e., subject to a participation constraint). Thus, this model is consistent with 
the current practice where the seller selects the price slide and the base weight based on 
1In the above example, the allowable weight difference is 20 lbs. (520 lbs.- 500 
lbs.). 
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experience and accepts the contract with the highest bid price. Note that the seller is not 
constrained to reveal the true value of the estimated cattle delivery weight. The price slide 
is used to share the weight risk between the seller and the buyer. 
The second model uses a mechanism that allows risk-sharing and provides incentives 
for truthful revelation· of the seller's .estimate of average delivery weight. In this model,· the 
seller chooses the price slide and the base weight to maximize expected utility. Similar to the 
first modei here the buyer also chooses the contract price to maximize expected utility. The 
buyer's choice, however, is subject to the rationality constraint and the seller's maximization 
problem. This model is used to determine optimal values of the base weight, price slide, and 
the contract price. 
For each of these models, the characteristics of the optimal contract are determined 
using comparative statics. The effect of time to delivery oil the optimal contract price is 
determined using the comparative statics results. Before drawing any conclusions from the 
risk-sharing model, its predictions are empirically tested using actual auction data. For the 
risk-sharing and incentive model, a numerical example is used to illustrate the sensitivity of 
the optimal contract to ch~ges in time to delivery. Bailey and Holmgren's hypothesis is 
tested. Implications for optimally selecting contract prices and price slides are reported. 
Theoretical Background 
Principal-Agent Relationship 
In a perfectly competitive market, perfect information about factor and product quality, 
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prices, and effort exerted by agents is generally assumed (Sheldon). However, asymmetric 
information prevails in many real world situations. For example, the seller of a good may 
know more about production risk or product quality than the customers. Effort exerted by 
an agent may not be observable by others. In such cases, contractual arrangements may be 
used to optimally allocate resources. Principal"-agent theory provides a framework for 
modeling such allocation problems (Varian; Rees). The principal~agent relationship relies 
upon a "contract that the parties either propo~ or accept and that more or less specifies what 
the principal expects from the agent and what the agent will receive in return" (McLean Parks 
and Conlon, p. 822). 
Basic Principal-Agent Model 
In general, the principal is viewed as employing the agent to perform a specific job whose 
monetary outcome is, say, x. The outcome x is observable by both parties, but it depends on 
the .agent's action or effort which is not ·observable by the principal. The agent receives a 
payment in return for service. The basic principal-agent model can be built upon the 
following assumptions: Both the.principal·andtheagent maximize e~pected utility. Effort 
reduces the agent's expected utility and ~o, if the agent accepts the contract, he will choose 
a level of effort that is best for himself(e.g., Rees; van Ackere; Varian). This results in an 
incentive problem which the principal must· solve. The principal does so by designing· the 
. ' 
incentive payment, p(x), that will induce the agent to choose an effort level that is optimal for 
both parties. Formally, the model can be stated as (e.g., van Ackere): 
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Xmax 
(1) !: f Up[(x - p(x))]<l>(x, e')dx 
xmin 
Xmax 
s.t. f UAfp(x)]<l>(x, e')dx - V(e) ~ UA, (individual rationality) 
. . 
e e Argm~e f UAfp(x)]<l>(x, e)dx - V(e), (incentive compatibility) 
where e is the.action or effort that the principal wants to induce, UA is the reservation utility 
of the agent, U A() is the agent's utility function (q () > 0 and 11' () < O),plJ () is the 
principal's utility function(U'p() > 0 and U'p() < O); V(e) is the agent's disutility of effort 
(V'(e) ~ 0 and V"(e) ~ 0), and <l>(x, e) is the probability density function ofx, conditional on 
effort. The first constraint is the rationality constraint. This constraint postulates that the 
agent will only accept the contract if he can reach at least some minimum expected utility 
level· (called reservation utility), i.e., the contract does not make him worse off. It. guarantees · 
that the agent chooses the best possible effort level. 
Approaches to solving (1) have been widely discussed in the literature and will not be 
. . 
repeated here (see e.g., Jewitt~ Rees; Rogerson; Mirrless). In general, the first order approach 
is used. With this method, the incentive compatibility constraint is replaced with: 
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(2) J Uip(x)]<l>'(x, e)dx - V 1(e) = 0. 
xmin 
The first order approach will be used in this paper. 
One variant of model (1) that is worth noting is the pure risk-sharing model. This 
model is relevant when effort is observable or can be fixed at some arbitrary level. In this 
case, model (1) becomes: 
x....x· 
(3) Max ·r··· Up[(x - p(x))]<f>(x, e)dx 
/1{.x) 
xmin. 
x....x 
s.t. f Uip(x)]<l>(x, e)dx - V(e) ~ UA, (individual rationality) 
where e is a fixed level of effort. Contrary to (3), with model (1) there is a trade-off 
· between sharing risk and providing incentives (Holmstrom; Rees, 1985a). The first analytical 
model developed in this paper uses equation (3) while the second uses··equation (1). 
Modifying the Basic Model 
The principal-agent model has been used to determine optimal incentive contracts in many 
fields (see van Ackere for a survey). In most applications, model (1) is modified to suit the 
economic environment ofinterest. Contrary to (1), in many cases, effort or action is only 
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implicit in the formulation of the model. Sobel; for example, used a model in which the agent 
is assumed to have exerted effort ei when event I occurs. The model is formulated using the 
probability levels Pi rather than effort levels ei. 
Compensation schemes h~ve also been used to solve the incentive problem inherent· ., 
. .· . 
. . 
in principal:-agent relationships when the action of the agent is unobservable or outcome is 
uncertain (e.g., Nalebuff and Stiglitz; Rees, 1985b; Harris and Raviv). A number of 
compensation schemes that do not explicitly involve effort have been used. Weitzman, for 
example, fo11nulated a principal-ag~t model in which a compensation scheme is used to give 
. . 
· firms an incentive to not misrepresent their output target. Although Weitzman recognized 
that effort affects the output distribution, he did not explicitiy include effort in the model. 
Instead, in an extended version of the model, a bonus coefficient which is assumed to reflect 
. . 
the firm's willingness to exert more or less effort is used. Ross also used a compensation 
scheme to determine a firm manager's optimal choice of a financial structure. In Ross's 
model, effort is not used since the compensation scheme provides the agent with strong 
incentives to act in the interest of both parties. An incentive scheme which only implicitly 
· · refersto the agent's action is used in the models developed here. 
. . . . 
Analytical Model 
Feeder Cattle Contracting and The Incentive Problem 
The incentive problem described above is inherent in any contractual arrangement where 
informational asymmetry is present (see e.g., Nicholson; Holmstrom). Hendricks and Porter 
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define infonnation on a common value auction as asymmetric when "the precisions of signals 
observed [concerning the value of the object to be sold] vary across participants" (p. 865). 
This definition fits well the case of feeder cattle auctions where sellers have better information 
about expected weights than buyers. Similar definitions of asymmetric information have been 
used in the principal-agent literature (see, e.g., Harris and Townsend; Haugen and Taylor; 
Holmstrom) . 
. Consider a feeder cattle buyer who wants to contract with a seller for future delivery 
of cattle. The seller must,deliver cattle with an acceptable weight and in return shall receive 
a payment from the buyer. The buyer's payment depends, of course, on delivered weight, Y, 
which is observable by both parties at delivery. At the time of contracting, the seller must 
provide an estimate ofY. The buyer, of course, would like an.honest estimate ofY since his 
payment depends on it. However, the seller is better informed about expected weight than 
. the buyer and so, an incentive problem (moral hazard) arises. Indeed, the seller may have 
incentive to misrepresent the estimate ofY and take advantage of the information asymmetry. 
This type of behavior prevails when there is asymmetric information because· economics 
•agents·respond to the incentives they face (Nicholson). 
Under asymmetric information,. monitoring or a compensation scheme can be used to 
provide econolllics agents with an incentive to not.misrepresent their target output, efforts, 
or abilities (see e.g., Nalebuff and Stiglitz; Weitzman). In the case of feeder cattle 
contracting, by offering a price slide, the seller guarantees to bear part of the weight risk. The 
larger the price slide, the more the weight risk shifted to the seller (Bailey and Holmgren). 
With the price slide, the payment per head (p(Y)) from the buyer· to the seller has the 
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following form: 
(4) p(Y) = {Po - y(Y - YL) if Y > YL Po . if Y :s: YL 
where p0 is the contract price, y is the price slide, and YL = Y0 + o is the weight limit specified 
in the contract. Y0 is the seller's estimate ofY and o is the allowable weight difference. The 
payment p(Y) is a compensation scheme which penalizes the agent if delivered weights are 
greater than Y v Compensation schemes of this type are used in many real world contractual 
relationships where asymmetric information exists (e.g., Phlips; Harris and Raviv). 
Since the price slide is costly, the compensation scheme p(Y) should, theoretically, 
give the seller an incentive to reveal his estimate of Y honestly and feed cattle to an 
acceptable weight. But this may not be the case in practice since the price slide are 
'arbitrarily' selected by the seller. When the price slide is selected in this way, weight risk 
may not be optimally shared between the seller and the buyer. In this case, the seller may still 
misrepresent the estimate ofY. The compensation scheme will therefore not be efficient.and 
resources misallocation will result. If an optimal incentive contract is sought ( a contract that 
will lead to optimal resources allocation under conditions of asymmetric information), the 
auction must design the contract in such a way that the seller not only provides an honest 
estimate of Y, but also select a price slide that is desirable for both parties. 
A Principal-Agent Model for Feeder Cattle Contracting 
Shavell indicated that "economic arrangements which involve problems of risk-sharing and 
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incentives may be described in terms of the principal and agent relationship" (p. 55). The 
problem just described can be modeled using the principal-agent framework. Principal-agent 
theory can also be used to design optimal incentive feeder cattle contracts. 
(5) 
Consider the payment p(Y). The seller's (agent) payoff is: 
:... { [p0 - y(Y - Y0 - 6)]Y 
rA - y Po 
ifY>YL 
if y ~ YL. 
Let v(Y, V) represents a per unit value function for cattle, where V is a vector of other 
relevant variables and Vy(Y, V) < 0. Note that feed prices are not directly used in v(Y, V). 
Corn prices are only implicitly included since changes in corn prices would change Vy(Y, V). 
The share of the cattle's value that goes to the buyer (principal) is: 
(6) r = { [v(Y, S) - (p. 0 - y(Y - Y0 - 6))]Y if Y > YL 
P [v(Y, S) - p 0]Y if Y ~ YL. 
Note that E(rp) would be zero if markets were competitive and information is perfect, i.e., the 
principal would break-even. To simplify, assume that there is one agent and one principal. 2 
Moreover, the agent and the principal are risk averse since they are both exposed to weight 
risk. The allowable weight difference, 6, is assumed to be set exogenously for simplicity. 
With these assumptions, the principal-agent model can be developed as follows. Consider 
first the case where the seller set the price slide and the base weight 'arbitrarily' (as is 
2Given our objective, there is no loss of generality with this assumption (see e.g., 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz). 
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currently done). The contractual arrangement occurs in two steps. The seller announces the 
values of the price slide and the base weight. Given these values, the buyer then chooses the 
contract price to maximize expected utility. In doing so, the buyer must ensure that the seller 
will accept the · price. 3 The principal.;agent model that corresponds to this case can be 
formulated as follows: 
(7) A,fax J Up[rp(Y, p0)]1{Y; 6*)dY + f Up[rp(Y, p0, Y0, y)]f{Y, · 6*)dY 
Po ymin YL 
YL }"max 
· s.t. f UA[rA(Y, p0)]g(Y, 6~dY + f UirA(Y, p 0, Yo, y)]g(Y, 6)dY ~ UA 
ymin YL 
where f( ) and g( ) are probability density functions and all other variables are defined as 
previously. Different density functions ofY are used for the agent and the principal since 
. information about weight variability is asymmetrically distributed. 6 is a set of information 
on which g( ) is conditional. 6 includes variables such as time to delivery and season 
and 6 * c 6. The reservation utility UA may be .. viewed as the utility level that the agent 
can achieve by selling the cattle on a different market for example. Note that the price slide 
and the base weight are fixed at y and Y0. They represent the arbitrary levels of the price 
slide and the base weight selected by the' agent. 
· 
3This is consistent the bidding environment in which contracting occurs. Bidding 
can be viewed as an optimization process in itself. Bidding for contracts has been 
modeled in many studies using principal-agent theory ( e.g., Samuelson; McAfee and 
McMillan (1986; 1987)). 
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The contract obtained by solving (7) does not guarantee an optimal solution to the 
incentive problem discussed above. This is because the agent can use the price slide to 
influence the principal's optimal choice of the contract price in his favor while misrepresenting 
his estimate of average delivery weight. This will be investigated using the comparative 
statics results. 
Let aside the relationship between the price slide and the contract price, the agent can 
always misrepresent his estimate of a,verage delivery weight since there is no "mechanism" 
in (7) that encourages honest revelation. A model that appropriately addresses the incentive 
problem inherent in the feeder cattle contractual arrangement can be formulated as follows: 
~ ~~ 
(8) Max f Up[rp(Y, p 0)]/(Y, 6*)dY + f Up[rp(Y, p 0, Y0, y)]l(Y, S*)dY 
Yo, Po, y ymin YL 
s.t. f UA[riY, p0)]g(Y, S)dY + f UA[rA(Y, p0, Y0, y)]g(Y, 6)dY ~. UA 
ymin YL 
ym~ ar (Y Y ) f U, A , Po, o, Y g(Y 6)dY = 0 
A aY ' 
y 0 
L 
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where all of the variables are defined as previously. As in the basic principal-agent model, the 
last two constraints of (8) are incentive compatibility constraints. Here, they insure that the 
agent will honestly reveal his estimate of average delivery weight as well as the price slide. 
Model (8) implies that the agent chooses the price slide and the base weight by solving a 
maximization.problem rather than arbitrarily as in.(7). The principal chooses the contract 
price by taking into account the rationality constraint and the agent maximization problem as 
well. Thus, the optimal values ofY0 and y are compatible with the principal's optimal choice 
ofp0 (see, e.g., Rees, 1985a, on this point).4 Since the principal and the agent optimal choices 
are mutually compatible, the agent has no interest in misrepresenting his estimate of average 
delivery weight. As in (I) , model (8) allows risk-sharing and provides incentives for 
truthtelling. For the rest of this paper, model (8) will be referred to as the risk-sharing and 
incentives model. Model (7) will be referred to as the risk-sharing model. 
Comparative Statics 
A unique solution to optimization problems of the type considered here is not 
guaranteed. In such cases, one way to find a unique solution is to appropriately bracket the 
choice variable (see e.g., Rees, 1985; Holmstrom; Rogerson). This technique is adopted here. 
4Recall that contracting occurs in two steps. Here, however, there are two 
expected utility maximization problems. The agent chooses the price slide and the base 
weight to maximize the expected utility of r A given any contract price. The principal then 
chooses the contract price to maximize the expected utility of r P given the agent expected 
utility maximization conditions and the participation constraint. This ensures compatible 
optimal values of the contract parameters. 
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It is assumed that there exists an interval [PoL, Pou] over which problem (7) has a unique 
solution. PoL and Pou are lower and upper limits on Po, respectively. PoL can be considered as 
a reservation price and can be.used to compute the reservation utility. The Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions are (see e.g., Rogerson): 
~ 0 if Po =PoL 
(9) 
ymax ar f. [Up' + AUA']2J(Y, 6*)dY .. = O if (p ) 1 Po E OL• Pou 
apo 
ymin 
~ 0 if Po = Pou· 
Note that the strict equality condition only hold if Po is neither equal to PoL or Pou· 
The risk sharing model is difficult to solve analytically. To make tractable, one can 
be proceed as follows. First, consider the agent's maximizc;ttion problem for any given 
contract price p0. The optimal choICe of the agent can be determined by solving the two 
incentive compatibility constraints for Y0 and y as a function of the contract price and the 
weight slide. Then, by substituting this solution into the principal' s objective function, one 
can solve for the optimal value of the contract price p 0*. To find the optimal 
values y/ and y*, the optimal contract price is plugged in the formulas of Y0 and y 
0 
obtained from the agent's maximization problem. A similar approach has been used by van 
Ackere. Using this approach, comparative statics.are easily derived for both the agent and 
the principal's problems. 
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Comparative Statics Results 
Characteristics of the Optimal Risk.;.Sharing Contract. 
The following comparative statics results are obtained after totally differentiating the strict 
equality first order condition in equation (9) (see appendix A). Each result is derived under 
the usual assumption that all other exogenous variables are held fixed. 
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal contract price increases as the agent increases the price 
dp; 
slide: _o_ > O; but, it decreases when the allowable weight difference is 
dy . * 
increased: dpo < O. 
d5 
This implies that, with the current contracting practice, for small allowable weight differences, 
the agent will have strong incentives to select higher price.slides (for any given Y0 of course). 
PRorosmoN 2. The optimal contract price decreases when the agent's estimate of delivery 
· ·ht · · ·· d ·· dpo* < O we1g. 1s increase : --.. . 
. dY. 
0 
This result is as expected since heavier cattle are less valued as mentioned above. Results 
1 and 2 imply that, although heavier cattle are less valued, the agent can fixed a very high 
value of YO but still obtain a relatively high contract price. In fact, for fixed allowable 
weight difference and delivery weight, the agent can always obtain a higher contract price 
by simply increasing the price slide. The optimal value of the price slide is unknown and 
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weight risk may be inefficiently shared. Moreover, the price slide will not give the agent 
strong incentives to feed cattle at a desirable weight. At delivery, either the principal or 
the agent may end up worse off. Thus, results 1 and 2 imply that the optimal contract 
obtained here is inefficient. 
PRorosmoN 3. lhe effect of time to delivery on the optimal contract price is negative if the 
weight distributions are decreasing in the cattle weight variances, and positive otherwise. 
dpo· . aa; 
As 
2
shown in appendix A the sign of dt depend on the signs of at, 
aaA an ) arYI ) av( ) av( ) 
'.I\ - 0-'- and At the time of contracting, -- = 0. The at' - 2-· 2 ' at 2 2 at 
aap aaA a a CJp CJA 
following assumption are then made. - and - are positive. ft ) and g( ) are 
at at 
unimodal distributions. With these assumptions, if a.I{ ) and a.I{ ) are negative, 
2 2 d • d • aa p aa p 
h 'Po '11 b · 'Po ·11 b · · h · t en -- wi e negative. - w1 . e positive ot erwtse. 
dt dt 
Characteristics of lhe Optimal Risk-Sharing and Incentives Contract 
The comparative· statics results are obtained using the approach outlined in the preceding 
section. The derivations are shown in appendix B. Considering the agent's optimization 
problem we have the following results. 
PROPOSffiON 4. lhe effect of the allowable weight difference on the optimal values of Y0 
dY.* d b . . . o < O· dy* <. 0 an r may e pos1tlve, negative, or zero: dB > , dB > . 
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The comparative statics in appendix B indicate that the effect of 6 on the optimal value of y 
depends on the sign of 
. . ar ar . 
r u"-2-2g(Y e)dY Jc2 A a6 By , 
El=-------
J: Uj'arA arAg(Y, 6)dY 
C2 a6 aY0 . 
while its effect on Y0 depends on the sign of 
ar ar ( [U"---1-2 + U 1Y]g(Y, 6)dY 
· J, · >1 aY. a A 
C2 .. O Y 
where 0 2 is the relevant support ofY. The signs of El and E2 cannot be determined a 
priori: Indeed, E 1 and E2 may have the same sign or different signs~ they may both be equal 
· to zero or one may be positive or negative and the other equals to zero. Thus, the effects of 
the weight slide .on the optimal values of the base weight and price slide cannot be signed . 
. . PRoPOsmoN s.· The optimal values of Y0 and y may decreas~. increase, or remain the same 
dYo* < dy* < if time to delivery is increased: -- - O· and - - 0. 
dt>' dt> 
As in (d), here, the impacts of time to delivery depend an expression that cannot be signed a 
pnon. 
For the principal' s optimization problem, the effects of weight slide and time to 
delivery on the optimal contract can be determined by proceeding as in the case of the risk-
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sharing model after replacing YO and y by Y0* and y *. The results will be the same as in 
the case of the risk-shari_ng model. 
Empirical Test of The Risk-Sharing Model 
Test Procedures 
If sellers'• estimates of average delivered weights are unbiased, the mean of the differences 
between actual and estimated delivery weights should be zero. Let e be the mean of the 
differences between the two weights. Then, the null hypothesis to be tested is Ho: e = 0. This 
hypothesis is tested using a t-test. A similar approach is use~ to test the null hypothesis that 
the difference in the number of head offered and the number of head delivered is zero. 
. . 
The assumption that weight variability increases with time to delivery is tested using 
the following equation: 
where e = w. -We and v is distributed with mean zero and variance 
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The variable WEIGHT represents the base weight, WEIGHT2 is the square of the base 
weight, STEERS is a dummy variable for steers, TIME denotes time to delivery, the Yis are 
year dummy variables, the Dis are quarter dunimy variables, and WEST, SOUTH, UPPER, 
and WCOAST are dummy variables representing the regions where the cattle are located. 
Equations (11) and (12) are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation procedures 
inSHAZAM. 
The effects of the contract weight, weight slide, price slide, and time to delivery on 
the contract price are derived from the following equation: 
Kl K2 
+ a..,PSUDE*e + a.gWSUDE*e + E a.pLCi + E a.pMCi + e, 
i=9 i=Kl+I 
where e has mean zero and variance 
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The variable p0 is the contract price, e is the predicted value of the standard deviation of 
weight, WSLIOE is the weight slide, PSLIDE is the price slide, FEEDER and FEEDER2 are 
the nearby futures price and its square, respectively, OLC is other lot characteristics, OMC 
is other market conditions, NUM and NUM2 are the number of head and the square of the 
number of he.ad, respectively, and all other variables are defined as previously. Note that 
contrary to Bailey et al. 's (1991; 1993) formulation where weight risk is defined as the ratio 
of the weight slide to the price slide, here weight risk is accounted for with the variables 
WLSIDE*e and PSLIDE*e. This formulation is less restrictive than the one used by Bailey 
et al. 
The mean and .variance equations. of this regression model are estimated using 
maximum likelihood. The estimated mean equation is used·to plot the contract price against 
base weight, weight slide, and time to delivery. 
The data used to test for unbiasedness of the base weights and estimate the two 
regression models are actual Superior Livestock Auction data for the 1987-1989 period 
(Bailey). The data contain information on lot characteristics, contract prices, base weights, 
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and other relevant variables needed to estimate the models. 5 Before discussing the regression 
results, the summary statistics and the histograms of selected variables are presented. The 
summary statistics are reported in table 1. Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent the histograms of 
the differences in weight and number of head, price slide, and weight slide, respectively. 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the distribution of the difference in weights is more spread than 
that of the difference in the number of head. The histogram of the price slide indicates that 
most of the values of the price slide are clustered around 3, 4, and 5 cents per hundred 
weight. The histogram of the weight slide shows that most values of the weight slide are 10 
or 25 pounds. 
Empirical Test Results 
Table 2 contains the t-ratios and p-values of the tests that the differences in weights and head 
are zero. The p-values indicate that the difference in weights is significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level while the difference in head is not. Sellers' estimates of average 
weights are biased upward but the number of head is generally not biased. This confirms the 
inference drawn from the comparative statics results that sellers' estimates of average delivery 
weights can be biased. 
The parameter estimates of equations (11) and (13) are reported in tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. The parameter estimate of time to delivery in the cattle weight variance equation 
( table 3) is positive, indicating that time to delivery has a positive effect on the weight 
5Data after 1989 were available. They are not used here since they do not contain 
all the information needed. 
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vanance. This conforms with the assumption made in the theoretical model. In the contract 
price equation (table 4), the parameter estimates of the price slide variables are all positive. 
This confirms the prediction in proposition 1 that the contract price increases with the price 
slide. The base weight was used in equation (13) in quadratic form. The parameter estimate 
of the base weight is negative while that of the square of the base weight is positive. Figure 
5 shows the effect of the base weight on the contract price. As expected, the contract price 
decreases asbaseweight·is increased. This validates proposition·2 of the theoretical model. 
The effect of time to delivery on the contract price is plotted in figure 6. The contract price 
is shown to increase.with small values of time to delivery·and to decrease otherwise. In the 
actual data set, most of the values of time to delivery are within the range where .the contract 
price increases. This may explain why past studies found that time to delivery has a positive 
effect of the contract price. The effect of the weight slide on the contract price is shown in 
figure 7. The contract price decreases when the weight slide is increased. This result was 
expected since the base weight and the weight slide must have the same effects. It also 
conforms to proposition 1 in the theoretical model. 
The effects of the weight and price slide on the base weight were also plotted. The 
plots were derived from the regression of the weight and price slides on the base weight and 
the base weight squared. Figure 8 indicates that the base weight decreased when the price 
slide was increased. In figure·9, the weight slide is shown to increase with increases in the 
base weights. 
The empirical tests just discussed strongly support the predictions of the risk-sharing 
model. The estimates of average delivery weight are biased thus, verifying the argument that 
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the risk-sharing contract is inefficient in solving the incentive problem mentio·ned earlier. The 
fixed price slide failed because it does not guarantee unbiased estimates of average weights. 
Illustrative Example of The Risk-Sharing and Incentives Model 
The Optimization Approach 
This section describes a numerical example used to obtain more insight into the comparative 
statics of the risk-sharing and incentives modet The numerical example is also used to test 
· the hypothesis that .sellers offer higher price slides when they are confident in their estimates 
of average weights. The numerical example is also u~ed to determine how sellers should set 
the price slides and what an efficient contract would be. 
The principal and the agent are assumed to possess negative exponential utility 
· functions. The functions :ft ) and g( ) are assumed to be normal density functions. Gauss 
· Legendre quadrature formulas with sixty-point gaussian quadrature weights and abssicas are 
used to· approximate the expected utilities of the agent and· the principal. The gaussian 
quadrature weights and abssicas are obtained from Stroud and Secrest. The complete 
derivation of the approximation is described in appendix C. 
In tlle previous section it was shown that the agent estimate of weight is biased. This 
bias, however, was small. Here, the model is solved with weight unbiasedness imposed, but 
. . 
the weight slide is determined optimally rather than assuming it fixed. Weights unbiasedness 
is imposed ·by setting the actual and the estimated weights equal to 630 pounds (sample 
mean). The effects of time to delivery on the optimal values of the contract are determined 
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by varying the weight variances of the agent and the principal' s weight distributions. To test 
Bailey and Holmgren hypothesis, we proceed as follows. The weight variance of the principal 
is held :fixed. · The optimal contract is then solved for different weight variances of the agent 
distribution. Bailey and Holmgren's hypothesis would be rejected if the optimal price slides 
decrease as weight variances are decreased. 
If estimated weights are truly :unbiased and the price slides greater than the marginal 
true values of the cattle (i.e. y > ".'vv( )), then the incentive problem would be effectively 
eliminated. In what follows, the· optimal contract is solved assuming weights unbiasedness 
and letting, the price and weight slides :fixed at 5¢/cwt and 15 pounds, respectively. The 
optimal contract prices is solved for under two different values of v(Y, V), the actual value 
and a 20 percent decrease in the actual value. The marginal market values of the cattle are 
. . 
then calculated and compared to the price slide ( as indicated in parentheses above). These 
results will give important information about how sellers should set the price slides. 
Results of The Numerical Example 
·The· optimal contract prices, price slides, and weight slides· are. reported in table 5 for different 
weight variances. The weight slides decrease as time to delivery increases. As predicted by 
the theoretical model, the optimal contract prices increase when· the weight slides are 
. . .. : ,: ' : . . . 
decreased. It was argued that buyers would require higher price slide if time to delivery is 
increased. This was shown to hold with the regression results reported in table 4. The results 
obtained here show that the price slide does increase when time to delivery increases. 
These results did not change when the weight variance of the buyer was held :fixed and 
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the seller's weight variance varied. The price slides decrease when the seller's weight 
variance is decreased. This indicates that Bailey and Holmgren's hypothesis does not hold. 
Table 6 reports the optimal values ofthe contract price when weight unbiasedness·is 
imposed and the weight and price slides held fixed. As before, the optimal contract price 
increases when the weight variance increases, The third column of table 6 reports the optimal 
contract prices when the slope of the cattle true value function, v( ), is decreased by 20 
percent. ·. In this case, the \l'&ues of the optimal contract price are lower than those in column 
two. This result reflects the fact that the seller's payoff depends on market discounts. The 
impacts of a 1 percent decrease are calculated.by interpolation. They range from ¢1.8/cwt 
to ¢2/cwt decrease in the cattle true value. These values are less than the value of the price 
slide used (¢5/cwt). 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this numerical example. First, Bailey and 
Holmgren's hypothesis does not hold. Second, sellers should offer higher price slides when 
time to delivery is increased. Indeed, for buyers, the price.slide is like a warranty against 
bearing most of the weight risk. Also, since the price slide is costly, it imposes truthfulness 
. . . 
on the part· of the seller. The seller has interests to deliver cattle with an acceptable ·average 
weight. The benefit of higher price slides for the seller is to receive higher contract price 
offers from the buyer. Third, · the seller must set the price slide greater than the market 
discount. In fact, there is no reason for the buyer to offer a high contract price if the contract 
discounts less heavier cattle than the market does. Note that this pricing method is only 
efficient if estimated weights are unbiased. · If estimated weights are biased, a fixed price slide 
will fail in any case. Finally, note that since the price slide increases with time to delivery, the 
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forward contract premium will also increase as time to delivery increases. Intuitively, higher 
contract. premiums create the. incentives to deliver cattle with acceptable· average weights. 
As time to delivery increases, higher contract premiums are indication of the seller willingness 
to deliver cattle with acceptable weights. Cattle are valued more at higher contract premiums. 
Thus, the contract prices increase as time to delivery increases. 
Conclusions· 
Two models are developed in this paper to explain the process of determining optimal 
contracts for feeder cattle sold through video auctions or by private treaties. The two models 
are based on principal-agent theory. In the first modei the price slide and the base weight are 
assumedfixed. This is consistent with the current contracting practice. The characteristics 
of the optimal contract obtained using this model are determined through comparative statics. 
An empirical test using actual auction data. shows that the model's predictions are consistent 
with actual behavior. However, the optimal contract is shown to be inefficient in solving the 
. ,· '• . 
incentive problem inherent in the feeder cattle contractual arrangement. Sellers' 
underestimate average delivery weights by 3. 5 pounds, so the present system does lead to a 
small amount of bias. 
An alternative model which uses a mechanism that allows risk-sharing and provides 
incentives for truthful revelation of the selle( s estimate of average delivery weight is 
developed. . The model is used determine the optimal contract assuming conditions of 
unbiased average delivery weights. The optimal · contract is the contract for which the 
49 
discount is at least greater than the market discount. If weights are truly unbiased, such a 
contract will eliminate the incentive problem. 
Several implications were drawn from the models used in this paper. First, Bailey and 
Holmgren' s hypothesis does not hold. Second, sellers should offer higher price slides when 
time to delivery is increased. Indeed, for buyers, the price slide is like a warranty against 
bearing most of the weight risk. Also, since the price slide is costly, it imposes truthfulness 
· on the part of the seller. · The seller has interests to deliver cattle with an acceptable average 
. . 
weight. The benefit of higher price slides for the seller is to receive higher contract price 
offers from the buyer. Third, the seller must set the price slide greater than the market 
discount. In fact, there is no reason for the buyer to offer a high contract price if the contract 
discounts less heavier cattle than the market does. ··Note that this pricing method is only 
efficient if estimated weights ·are unbiased. If estimated weights are biased, a fixed price slide 
will fail in any case. Finally, note that since the price slide increases with time to delivery, the 
forward contract premium will also increase as time to delivery increases. Intuitively, higher 
contract premiums create the incentives to deliver cattle with acceptable average weights. 
. . . 
As time to delivery increases, higher contract premiums are indication of the seller willingness 
to deliver cattle with: acceptable weights. Cattle are valued more at higher contract premiums. 
Thus, the ~pntra:ct prices increase as time to delivery increases. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, Video Cattle Auction Data, 1987-
1989 
Variable Units Mean Minimum Maximum 
Heads Offered 155.0 19.0 2250.0 
Heads Delivered 153:l 14.0 1980.0 
Base Weight. pounds 631.2 240.0 1200.0 
Actual Weight 634,7 158.1 1244.6 
Contract Price $/cwt 82.4 5L5 130.0 
Difference in 
Number of Head -1.7 -1925.0 1435.0 
Difference in 
Weight 3.5 -381.9 385.1 
Price Slide cents/cwt 5.3 0.0 80.0 
Weight Slide pounds 15.6 · -25.0 .· 40.0 
Time to Delivery days 37.7. . 1.0 290.0 
Note: The number of observations is 3119. 
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Standard 
Deviation 
132.2 
129.3 
140.8 
143.4 
10.6 
77.6 
38.7 
3.7 
7.4 
36.5. 
Table 2. Tests for Significance Differences Between the Actual and the Estimated 
Weights and Number of Heads, Feeder Cattle Auction Data, 1987-1989 
Variable 
Differenc.e in Weight 
Difference in Head 
!-Ratio 
5.0070840 
~1.2377666 
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P-Value 
0.0001 
0.2159 
Table 3. Parameter Estimates of the Cattle Weight Variance Equation, Feeder 
Cattle Auction Data, 1987-1989 
Variable 
Mean Equation 
Intercept 
Steers 
Y88 
Y89 
DJ 
D3 
D4 
West 
South 
Upper 
West Coast 
Variance Equation 
Intercept 
Weight 
Weight Square 
Date 
Y88 
Y89 
DJ 
D3 
D4 
West 
South 
Upper 
West Coast 
Estimated 
Loglikelihood 
Parameter 
Estimate 
4.7861 * 
7.5208* 
-'l.5834 
-6.4764* 
0.4099 
-7.9019* 
..;3.4734** 
1.4832 
3.8760* 
-1.1749 
4.1391 
4.8502* 
0.0048* 
-0.0021* 
0.0039* 
0.0179 
. -0.1806* 
0.1400* 
0.3143* 
0.0905 
0.2621 * 
-0.2460* 
-0.4261 ** 
-0.3396* 
-15684.5000 
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the 5 percent level 
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Standard 
Error 
1.8190 
1.3060 
1.8610 
1.9240 
1.9090 
1.7550 
2.0230 
2.0830 
1.9600 
5.7010 
2.8100 
0.4648 
0.0015 
0.0011 
0.0007 
0.0706 
0.0762 
0.0752 
0.0695 
0.0894 
0.0779 
0.0993 
0.2674 
0.1452 
Table 4. Parameter Estimates of the Contract Price Equation, Video Cattle Auction 
Data, 1987-1989 
Variable 
Mean Equation 
Intercept 
Futures Price 
Futures Price Square 
Steers 
Number 
Weight 
Number Square 
Weight Square 
English-Exotic-Cross 
English-Cross 
Exotic-Cross 
Angus 
Dairy 
Medium Heavy 
Medium Flesh 
Light-Medium Flesh 
Large Frame 
Medium-Large Frame 
Medium Frame 
No Horn 
Some Horn 
DJ 
D3 
D4 
West 
South 
Upper 
West Coast 
LSW 
Truck 
Unmixed 
Time 
Miles 
Parameter 
Estimate 
10.3400 
2.4539* 
-0.0109* 
4.4599* 
0.0012* 
-1.1471* 
-0.0005** 
0.0764* 
-0.7040* 
-0.6731* 
-1.2781* 
0.9993 
-10.1170* 
-1.6031 * 
-1.5601 * 
-1.8281 * 
4.5034* 
3.6222* 
1.5903 
0.2962 
-0.4757* 
0.8801 * 
2.0416* 
1.1826* 
0.0790 
-4.5778* 
2.2601* 
-2.3772* 
-1.16.52* 
-0.4893 
0.8959* 
0.0229* 
-0.0127* 
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Standard 
Error 
15.3800 
0.4008 
0.0026 
0.2879 
0.0005 
0.0047 
0.0003 
0.0035 
0.3470 
0.3498 
0.3773 
0.7197 
0.5075 
0.4028 
0.3833 
0.4177 
1.5470 
1.5480 
1.5840 
0.4784 
0.1163 
0.1650 
0.3159 
0.2501 
0.1998 
0.2901 
0.4592 
0.2928 
0.1245 
0.4111 
0.4669 
0.0029 
0.0002 
Table 4. Continued 
Price Slide 0.0634* 0.0175 
Weight Slide -0.0270* 0.0147 
Y88 1.1773* 0.2239 
Y89 2.7880* 0.3422 
Time Square -0.00009* 0.0000 
WSLIDE*e 0.0047* 0.0015 
PSLIDE*e 0.0282* 0.0037 
Variance Equation 
Intercept 18.5030* 7.5400 
Weight -0.0250* 0.0015 
Weight Square 0.0164* 0.0011 
Number -0.0011 * 0.0003 
Number Square 0.0002 0.0002 
Time -0.0053* · 0.0017 
Time Square 0.000006 0.0000 
Futures Price -0.1781 0.2002 
Futures Price Square O.OOll 0.0013 
West -0.1408* 0.0781 
South 0.1419 0.0995 
Upper -0.7824* 0.2690 
West Coast -0.4865* 0.1458 
DJ O.Oll7 0.0944 
D3 0.1506 0.0994 
D4 0.1706 O.ll31 
Y88 -0.2471 * 0.0958 
Y89 -0.2976* O.ll68 
Estimated 
Loglikelihqod -7775.6000 
Note: Asterisks denote significance at the 5 percent level 
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Table 5. Optimal Contract Price, Weight Slide; and Price Slide for Alternative Values 
. of Cattle .Weight Variance and Weight Slide, Risk".'Sharing and Incentives Model 
Standard Deviation 
of Weight 
70 
60 
50 
Contract Price 
($/cwt) 
92.00 
90.80 
84.50 
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Optimal Values of 
Weight Slide 
(Pounds) 
-21.263 
-3.354 
12.127 
Price Slide 
(cents/lbs) 
4.675 
4.644 
3.868 
Table 6. Optimal Contra~t Price for Alternative Values of Cattle Weight Variance, 
Weight Unbiasedness Imposed 
Standard Deviation 
ofWeight·· 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
Actual Value of Cattle 
64.0 
64.1 
64.3 
64.5 .. 
64.8 
65.1 
Contract Price for (in $/cwt) 
20% Decrease in Actual Value 
60.3 
60A 
60.5 
60.6 
60.7 
61.0 
Note: The slope of the cattle per unit value function was decreased by 20 percent. 
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Figure 1. The histogram of the differences between actual and estimated 
feeder cattle weights, 1987-1989 
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Figure 2. The histogram of the differences between the actual and the number 
of heads offered, 1987-1989 
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Figure 3. The histogram of the price slide of the video cattle auction data, 1987-1989 
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Figure 4. The histogram of the weight slide, feeder cattle auction data, 1987-1989 
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Figure 5. 'fhe effect of cattle weights. on the contract price 
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Figure 6. The effect of time to delivery on the co11tract price 
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Figure 8. Price slide versus base weight 
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Appendix A 
For all proofs, we will assume that changes in the principal and agent's subjective variances 
of weight (a/and o/, respectively) are induced by changes in time to delivery. 
Consider model (8): 
YL Yn;ax 
Max f Up[rp(Y, p 0}]t(Y, 0*)dY + f Up[rp(Y, p0, Y0, y)]l{Y, 0*)dY 
Po ymin YL 
ymax 
s.t. f UiriY, p0)]g(Y, 0)dY + f UiriY, p0, Y0, y)]g(Y, 0)dY ~ UA 
Y..;;,. YL 
For Po e ]p01_, PouL the Kuhn-Tucker condition is: 
ymax a ymax a 
I rp * I 7A . I Up--fiY, 0 )dY - A f UA-· g(Y, 0)dY = 0 
· a a Y. . 'Po . Y. . 'Po 
mm mm 
arp 
-, the Kuhn-Tucker condition can be written as: 
Bpo 
Totally differentiating this first-order condition yields: 
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where the term ~ stands for the second partial derivative of 
1'. . . . 
J[U/1{.Y, 8*) + )..U~g(Y, 8)] :rP dY with respect to I. After rearranging and canceling terms, 
r. . . Po 
nm 
we obtain 
From this equation, we obtain the following comparative results: 
- only the price slide changes 
( [U"ny 6*) - 1t.U11g(Y 6)]arP arPdY 
Jc pJ\ ' A ' ·ay ap0 • 
dy 
. · r [U/JlY, 6*) - J...u~'g(Y, 6)](aarp)2dY 
Jc ~o · 
Note that the· second~order condition for a maximum requires that the denominator be 
. negative. Here, this means that U/.f{Y, 6*) - ')..U~1g(Y, 6) < 0. Given this condition, the 
• . . Th dpo* 0 
numerator 1s positive. us, - > . 
dy 
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- only YO changes 
ar ar Jc [U;:j{Y, O*) - J...Uj1g(Y, O)] ar.p --!:..dYa p 
o . o 'Po 
( [U~'.f{Y, O*) - J...Ujg(Y, O)](aarP)2dY 
Jo . ~ 
Both the numerator and the denominator are negative. Thus, dpo* < 0. 
dYO 
- only a changes 
- only time to delivery changes 
dp* 
Similar to Y0, --0 < 0 . d5 
It is assumed that time to delivery, t, affects both the distribution ofY and the per unit cattle 
value. We havethe following result: 
r [u;' arP av(Y)1{Y, O*) + tJ~a.f{Y, O*) aa; + ujag(Y, O) ao!] arP dY 
JO av(Y) at aa2 at aa2 at apo p A 
·-= 
dt' 
The key factors here are the sigris of av(Y, Z), a.f{Y, O*), 
2 2 at ~2 
aa p aa A av(Y. 
assume that - > 0 and - > 0. Also, ' = 0 & & & 
2 
ag(Y, 0) aap 
and - We 
at . 2 aaA 
at the time of contracting and 
at delivery. With these assumptions, the effect of time to delivery on the optimal contract 
price depends on the signs of aj{Y, O*) and ag(Y, O) which can be negative or positive. 
aa; aa! 
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Appendix B: Optimal Risk-Sharing and Incentives 
Consider the last two const~ts of model (8). They are the first order condition of the agent 
maximization problem: 
Ymax ar (Y ·· Y. . ) f U , A , Po, o, Y nlY. e)dY· = o A aYo o\ ' 
YL . 
~ . . .· 
max ar (Y p Y. y) · f U) A ' a~ o, g(_Y, 6)dY = 0 
YL . . 
totally differentiating, we have 
. ar ar ar . 
f Uj'(~)2dYr,K(Y, B)dY + f [U~,~~ + U~Y]dyg(Y, B)d(}) = Cl dp0 + Cl1;dl:, Je2.i aYo Je2.i ay aYo Po 
+ Cl fit 
70 
+ C2[1t. 
The second-order conditions for a maximum require that 
ar . ar i u} Ca·r:A )2g(Y, 6)dY < 0, i U~1( a A )2g(Y, 6)dY < 0, and 
D2 0 D2 y 
- only <> changes. 
Then, 
Since D > 0, the sign of dy* depends onthat of the numerator. By rearranging terms, it 
dfJ 
can be shown that the sign of the numerator depends on that of 
dY.* 
Similarly, the sign of - 0- depends on of the sign of 
dfJ 
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- only time to delivery changes 
·. . C2,* ( u~'( 07A)2g(Y, 6)dY - Cl,* ( [U~' 07A arA + U~Y]g(Y, 6)dY 
t1y• ···· . 102 oY0 · ·. 102 BY0 oy So - = · . 
' • D 
The sign of the numerator depends on the sign of 
c21 E3 = - -
Cl, ar i u~'<~)2g(Y, O)dY 
0 2 oY0 
E3 can be positive or negative. Thus, the sign of ~t* is ambiguous. Similarly, 
dY.* . d; cannot be signed a priori. 
Substituting for the expressions of Y0 and y into (7) and the individual rationality 
constraint, the piincipal's optimization problem becomes 
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Proceeding as in appendix A, the effects of time to. delivery, allowable weight difference, and 
the principal's subjective variance of weight on the optimal contract price can be determined. 
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Appendix C 
Assuming a negative exponential utility and a normal distribution function for Y, the 
principal' s expected utility function can be written as: 
-(Y-Y)2 -(Y-Y)2 
EU(rP) = 
Y0 + 6 2o2 YllllX 2o2 
- I e -Ap[v(.Y) - PolY * e p dY - I e -Ap[v(.Y) - <Po - y(Y - Yo - o))]Y * e p dY 
y . /FitaP y + 6 /FitaP 
nm 
-
Y-Y Let Z = Then, the expected utility of the principal can be rewritten as follows: 
aP 
b _ C _ _ 
EU(rP) = __ l_[J e -J..p(v(Y) ~ p0XopZ + .Y) - .5Z2dz + J e -J..p(v(Y) - (p0 - y(opZ + Y - Y0 - (>))J(opZ + 1') - .sz2dZ], 
{Fi.a b 
- -y. - y 
where a = _rm_n -- Yo + C) - Y Ymax - Y b = , and c = Each of the integrals in the 
square brackets can be evaluated by using Gauss Legendre quadrature formulas. To do so, 
. x(d - d) + d + d0 · 
we use the following change of variable Z = 1 0 1 (Gerald and Wheatley, 
2 
di d - d 1 x(d - d) + d + d 
p. 344). Then, using the factthat ffiZ)dZ = 1 2 ° f fi 1 0 2 1 0 )dx, the 
d0 -1 
expected utility of the principal can be expressed as: 
b .. 1 -Ap(v(.Y) _ F Xo x(b - a) + b + a + Y) _ (x(b - a) + b + a)2 
EU(rP) = - - 1-[--,--:__ a fe O p 2 8 dx 
Pr; 2 
VLH -1 
. b 1 -Ap[v(.Y) _ (p _ y(o x(c - b) + c + b + j _ y _ 6))](o x(c - b) + c + b + .Y)- _ (x(c - b) + c + b)2 
c- I O p 2 0 . 2 8 . 
+--e ~ 2 . 
-1 
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n 
With the Gauss Legendre quadrature approach, Jfix)dx = L w /(x), where wi and ~ are 
-1 i=l 
Gauss-Legendre quadrature weights and points, respectively. Thus, 
x,(b - a) + b + a - (x(b - a) + b + a)2 
l . b - a~ -lp(v(Y) - PoXap . 2 + Y) - ' 8 
EU(rP} = - -[--~ w,e firt 2 i•l 
x(c - b) + c + b - x(c - b) + c + b - (x(c - b) + c + b}2 
+ C "" b t We -lp[v(Y) - <Po - y(ap ' 2 + y - Yo - 6))](ap ' . 2 + 1') - ' 8 ]. 
2 i•l I 
Proceeding the same way, the expected utility of the agent can be approximated as: 
n x,(b - a) + b + a - · (x(b - a) + b + a}2 
1 b - a~ -lj.poX0A 2 + Y) - ' EU(rA) = - -[--. -~ w,e 8 firt 2 i•l 
x(c - b) + c + b - . xtc - b) + c + b - (x(c - b) + c + b)2 
c _ b ,f-. -lA(pO - y(aA ' + Y - Yo - 6))(aA + Y) - ' 
+ --~ w ,e 2 2 s ]. 
2 i•l 
The last two expressions of EU(rP) and EU(rA) are the ones used in the mathematical 
programming examples .. 
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WHAT SHOULD BE BELIEVED ABOUT GENERIC MEAT ADVERTISING? 
ABSTRACT 
United States producer organizations spend large amounts of money on generic advertising 
of both beef and pork and other promotion programs designed to stimulate consumers' 
demand for meat. Producers need to know if the money allocated to generic advertising and 
these promotion programs is effective in increasing the demand for meat. Past research has 
disagreed about the effectiveness of generic advertising. Models of Ward and Lambert and 
Brester and Schroeder are reestitnated and subjected to misspecification testing. The 
conflicting findings about generic advertising effectiveness are shown to be primarily due to 
the data transformation used by Ward and Lambert. The results of a correctly specified 
Rotterdam model (similar to Brester and Shroeder's model), show that generic advertising 
does not play an important role in explaining meat consumption. 
Key Words: beef, confirmation, demand, generic and branded advertising, misspecification 
testing, pork, Rotterdam model. 
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WHAT SHOULD BE BELIEVED ABOUT GENERIC MEAT ADVERTISING? 
United States producer organizations spent about 190 million dollars on beef checkoff 
programs over the 1987-1993 period. Expenditures on generic beef and pork advertising 
exceeded 200 and 70 million dollars over the 1970-1993 period, respectively. These 
advertising programs are designed to stimulate consumers' demand for beef and pork. 
Producers need to know if the money allocated to advertising is effective in increasing the 
demand for meat. Past research disagreed ab.out the effectiveness of generic advertising. 
While some studies report that generic advertising effectively increases meat demand, other 
studies find that generic advertising has no substantial effect on meat demand. For example, 
Brester and Schroeder and Kinnucan et al. found that generic beef and pork advertising has 
little effect on demand. Ward and Ward and Lambert, however, found that generic 
advertising has substantially increased beef demand. The question that arises from these 
contradictory :findings is what should be believed about the effectiveness of generic meat 
advertising? Industry groups apparently believe that generic advertising is a wise investment 
since they allocate enormous amounts of money to it. If advertising is not effective then the 
money should be spent elsewhere or returned to producers. 
Generic advertising effectiveness is assessed by estimating advertising elasticities. 
These elasticities are used to determined if advertising has a substantial effect on demand or 
not. The econometric models used to estimate the advertising response equations differ from 
one study to another. For example, Brester and Schroeder, Kinnucan et al., and Ward and 
Lambert all used different functional forms. Different functional forms may lead to different 
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conclusions about the effectiveness of generic advertising (see e.g., Green et al.). Other 
factors that may lead to different inferences about the effectiveness of generic advertising are 
the use of different data and the variables included in the demand model. 
Of the studies evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. generic meat advertising only 
Kinnucan and V enkateswaran included misspecification testing. Reliable elasticity estimates 
can only be obtained if the models used are correctly specified (McGuirk et al., 1993; 1995). 
McGuirk et al. (1993; 1995) misspecification test procedures can be used to test if all of the 
underlying assumptions of the models hold. The test procedures help identify possible 
problems with parameter stability, omitted relevant variables, and functional form, for 
example. Importantly, these misspecification tests can be used to guide model respecification. 
This paper aims to determine why current studies on the effectiveness of U.S. generic 
meat advertising has reached conflicting conclusions. Demand models of Brester and 
Schroeder and Ward and Lambert that have led to different conclusions about the 
effectiveness ofU.S. generic meat advertising are reestimated and tested for misspecification. 
Brester and Schroeder used generic advertising expenditures while Ward and Lambert used 
beef checkoff expenditures data. In this paper, each model is estimated using both data. 
Specific problems related to the modeling approach used by Brester and Schroeder and Ward 
and Lambert are discussed. Correctly specified models are developed and used to reassess 
the effectiveness of generic meat advertising. Implications for future research on evaluating 
the effectiveness ofU.S. generic meat advertising are discussed. 
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Background on Incorporating Advertising in Demand Models and Related Literature 
Advertising in Single-Equation Models 
Generic advertising of a particular good is intended to enhance consumers' demand for that 
good. Thus, generic advertising has been included in single-demand models as a demand 
shifter. In general, advertising is included in these models using current and/or lagged 
advertising expenditures as explanatory variables. The inclusion of lagged advertising 
expenditures accounts for the advertising carry over effects . Distributed lag models or the 
lag of the dependent variable have also been used to account for advertising carry-over effects 
(see, e.g., Capps and Smith; Kinnucan and Venk:ateswaran). 
Single-equation models are not consistent with consumer demand theory. With the 
exception of homogeneity, all of the restrictions implied by demand theory cannot be 
incorporated into these models. Demand systems, however, allow incorporating these 
restrictions for consistency with theory. 
Advertising in Demand Systems 
The most common demand systems used in applied work are the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) and the Rotterdam model. Contrary to the case of single-equation models, 
advertising can be incorporated into these demand systems in a way that is consistent with 
consumer demand theory (Brown and Lee; Selvanathan). Piggot et al. used the AIDS model 
to determine the effects of advertising on Australian meat demand. The Rotterdam model has 
been mostly used in the case ofU.S. generic meat demand (e.g., Kinnucan et al.; Brester and 
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Schroeder). 
Three major approaches for incorporating advertising into the Rotterdam model are 
reviewed here. The first approach is to consider advertising as a demand shifter. In this case, 
the Rotterdam model can be formulated as (Selvanathan; Brown and Lee): 
(1) w,dlnq; = a,dlnQ + L Pif"lnp1 + Ly iJdlnA.1 + e;, 
j j 
where wi is the budget share of the ith good, <Ii is per capita consumption of good I, pj is the 
nominal price of good j, ~ is real advertising expenditures on good j, dlnQ = Lwi dln(li is the 
DIVISIA volume index, and ei is the error term. Note that current and lagged advertising 
expenditures or a "goodwill" variable can be used in lieu of~-
The second and third approach to incorporating advertising in the Rotterdam model 
use scaling and translating techniques (Brown and Lee). In the case of scaling, advertising 
is viewed as affecting consumers' perceptions of the quality of the good being advertised 
(Brown and Lee). Scaling then consists of adjusting the price of the good to account for the 
effects of advertising on consumers' perceptions of quality (Brester and Schroeder). The 
Rotterdam model with scaling effects is (Brown and Lee): 
(2) w,dlnqi = «;(dlnQ + L w/',dlnA) + L Py(dlnpj - a,dlnA) - wi6,dlnA; + e;, 
j j 
where all of the variables are defined as before. 
In the translating approach, advertising is considered as affecting consumers' 
perceptions of basic needs (Brown and Lee). In this case, advertising has a income-like 
effects on demand. Advertising is therefore incorporated in the demand system by 
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augmenting the income variable with a "need or subsistence parameter'' (Brown and Lee, p. 
424). The Rotterdam model with translating is formulated as (Brown and Lee): 
(3) w1dlnqi = cx;(dlnQ - L ~\dlnA} + L ~ilnpj + 5,dlnAi + e;, 
j j 
where all of the variables are defined as previously. 
Brown and Lee showed that the scaling and translating models are restricted versions 
of the model specified in (1). They proposed a procedure for testing the scaling and 
translating models against the unrestricted model ( equation 1 ). The test procedure only 
requires estimating the unrestricted model. The parameter estimates of this model and the 
budget shares are used to calculate the test statistics (see Brown and Lee). 
Kinnucan et al. used the unrestricted model in (1) to determine the effectiveness of 
generic advertising on U.S. meat demand. The basic model in (1) was expanded to include 
a health information index and seasonal dummies as explanatory variables. They found that 
income, prices, and health information significantly affect meat demand, but generic 
advertising of beef and pork does not. Brester and Schroeder used the scaling model and 
found similar conclusions about the effectiveness of generic advertising. Brester and 
Schroeder's model is discussed in detail in the next section. 
The Models 
To achieve our objective, the studies conducted by Brester and Schroeder and by Ward and 
Lambert are considered. The data used by Brester and Schroeder were requested and 
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obtained from Brester. The beef checkoff expenditures data used in Ward and Lambert were 
obtained from Lambert. Ward declined to provide any additional data. Contrary to Brester 
and Schroeder, Ward and Lambert used a single-equation model. As mentioned earlier, these 
two studies reached conflicting conclusions about the effectiveness of generic beef 
advertising. 
Ward and Lambert Study 
Ward and Lambert estimated three models to determine the economic impact of U.S. beef 
checkoff efforts on demand. The first model was at the liveweight level and the second and 
third were at the boxed beef and retail market levels, respectively. The retail market model 
is the one considered here. The model estimated by Ward and Lambert is: 
where P bt is the real price of beef at the retail level, Qbv Q,a, and Qp, are the per capita 
disappearances of beef, pork, and poultry, respectively, J, is real per capita income, the S;, 
are quarterly dummy variables, E, and E,_ 1 are the current and lagged beef checkoff 
expenditures (used as proxies for current and lagged generic beef advertising expenditures), 
T1, and T2, are time trends, FR, is the feeder steer ratio, and e, is the error term~ The 
variable T1 increases one unit each quarter, starting with T 1 = 58 in 1979:2. T2 equals one 
before 1990: 1 and increases in units of one thereafter. 
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Application of Ward and Lambert's Model to Pork Data 
The effectiveness of generic pork advertising was determined in Brester and Schroeder's 
study but not in Ward and Lambert's. For comparison, a pork response function is estimated 
here using Ward and Lambert's model. The demand equation used is: 
+ 51ln[l + exp(-PIA,)] + 5t11[l + exp(-PIA,_1)] + eP 
where Pkt is the real price of pork, A1 and A1_1 are current and one-period lagged per capita 
generic pork expenditures, and all other variables are defined as before. Here, T 1 starts at 1 
in 1970: I and increases in units of one until 1993 :4. The time trend T2 is not used. It was 
used in (4) as an additional variable to account for intercept parameter instability (see Ward 
and Lambert, p. 458). 
Brester and Schroeder Study 
The purpose ofBrester and Schroeder's study was to determine the effects of both branded 
and generic advertising on consumer demand for beef, pork, and poultry. Using a Rotterdam 
model with scaling, all of the advertising expenditures were incorporated in the form of a 
stock of investment. The stock variable was obtained using a procedure proposed by Cox. 
This procedure allows accounting for advertising carry-over effects without imposing too 
much restriction on the shape of the advertising response function (see Cox). 
The Rotterdam model with scaling is nonlinear in the parameters. The specification 
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of the advertising stock variable makes this model even more nonlinear. Although Cox 
explains how end point restrictions can be used to make the model easier to estimate, it is still 
very intractable in the context of system misspecification testing. Brester and Schroeder 
indicated that they estimated a linear Rotterdam model without scaling effects. The price 
elasticities were similar to those obtained with the nonlinear model, suggesting that the scaling 
effects are negligible. 
To simplify matters and given the linear model yields similar results with the nonlinear 
model, the unrestricted linear Rotterdam model is used here to conduct the misspecification 
tests. The specific model is formulated as: 
3 3 
(6) w fllnqi = cx.flln.Q + L ~f11nPj + LY f1lnA-j + LL oijmd In Aftn + L <t>oPk + e;, 
.· j j j m•I k-1 
where A;m is them-period lagged advertising expenditures, the Dk's are quarterly dummy 
variables, and all other variables are defined as previously. Note that, here, the 
contemporaneous advertising variables include both brand and generic advertising. The 
lagged advertising variables, however, only include generic advertising expenditures. This 
is done to be consistent with the fact that no lagged branded advertising variable was used in 
Brester and Schroeder's model (see Brester and Schroeder). 
As in Brester and Schroeder, model ( 6) has four equations. The fourth equation 
represents other consumption goods. It is used to make the demand system weakly integrable 
(see Brester and Schroeder). Being linear, model (6) is relevant for applying McGuirk et al. 
(1996) system misspecification test procedures. 
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Procedures 
This section discusses the general approach used to determine if the conflicting conclusions 
about the effectiveness of generic meat advertising are due to different data, different 
variables, or different functional forms. In discussing each case, specific econometric and/or 
modeling issues that need to be addressed before a definitive conclusion can be drawn are also 
discussed. 
Different Data 
Ward and Lambert used beef checkoff expenditures as a proxy for generic advertising 
expenditures. Both beef checkoff and generic aqvertising expenditures are available to us. 
These expenditures are shown in figures 1 and 2 for the 1970: 1-1993:4 (sample size used by 
Brester and Schroeder) and 1979:2-1991:2 periods (sample size'used by Ward and Lambert). 
These figures seem to indicate that the use of different data on advertising may not lead to 
conflicting conclusions about the effectiveness of generic beef advertising. However, we 
argue that given the two models used here (Ward and Lambert and the Rotterdam model), 
the presence of many zero observations in the checkoff expenditures data may lead to 
differences in results. To provide some empirical evidence, the two models are estimated 
using both beef checkoff and generic advertising expenditures. For each model, the checkoff 
effect is calculated and compared to that of generic advertising. 
Consider Ward and Lambert's model. The transformed checkoff variable takes the 
value of zero when the checkoff expenditures are zero and a value greater than zero but less 
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than one otherwise. Thus, the checkoff variable has a dummy variable-type of effect. This 
is not the case for the generic advertising expenditures variable as shown in figure 3. It is 
apparent from this graph that, with Ward and Lambert model, differences in advertising 
effects may be due to the way zero observations are treated rather than to data per se. 
The problem of zero advertising expenditures also exists in the Rotterdam model since 
logarithms of the data are used for estimation. The problem is generally addressed by adding 
a small number to each observation in the advertising data set (see, e.g., Brester and 
Schroeder). As in Brester and Schroeder, here, 100 is added to all observations (zero and 
non zero advertising expenditures). The same number is added to the checkoff expenditures 
data for estimation of the Rotterdam model. Looking at the checkoff expenditures data, it 
appears that when the first differences are taken, one observation will be very large compared 
to the others. This is due to the fact. that there many consecutive zeros in the data and the 
first non-zero observation is a very large number. Since the number added to the observations 
is the same, the first differences of the logarithms yield zeros for all observation where the 
original number was zero. This problem does not occur in the generic advertising data (see 
plot later). Thus, with the Rotterdam model too, the treatment ofthe data for the purpose 
of estimation may lead to substantial differences in results. 
Functional Forms, Variables, and Advertising Effects 
Ward and Lambert's model does not include generic pork advertising. Neither does it include 
branded advertising for pork, beef, and poultry. Generic and branded advertising may 
sometimes be related (Kinnucan et al). If this is the case, then there will be an upward bias 
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in Ward and Lambert's estimates of the advertising effects, irrespective of what data are used. 
Apart from the variables and irrespective of the data used, Ward and Lambert's model 
may yield high advertising effects due to the way advertising is incorporated into the model. 
To determine if this is the case, advertising effects must be compared across functional forms. 
However, since Ward and Lambert's model is price dependent, its advertising effects cannot 
be directly compared to the Rotterdam model. Brester and Schroeder used price flexibilities 
of the Rotterdam model to compare the two advertising effects. These price flexibilities were 
obtained as the inverse of the directly estimated price elasticities. Huang showed that 
inverting a matrix of elasticities (in the case of demand systems) or taking the reciprocal of 
an elasticity (in the case of single-demand models) leads to incorrect estimates of flexibilities. 
Huang recommended using directly estimated flexibilities or elasticities "in agricultural policy 
and program analysis" (p. 313). Here, to compare the advertising effects obtained from the 
Rotterdam and the Ward and Lambert's models, directly estimated elasticities are used. 
Single-equation models are estimated using Ward and Lambert's data transformation and beef 
and pork quantities as dependent variables. The effects of advertising on beef and pork 
demand calculated from these models are then compared to those obtained from the 
Rotterdam model to determine if different functional forms lead to different conclusions about 
the effectiveness of advertising. 
Estimation, Confirmation, and Misspecification Testing 
Ward and Lambert's model is estimated using beef checkoff and generic advertising 
expenditures over the 1979:2-1991:2 sample period. Following Ward and Lambert, the 
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model is estimated using ordinary least squares holding the checkoff coefficient P fixed. The 
value of p used is the one for which the sum of squared errors are minimized. This procedure 
does not bias the parameter estimates, but it may bias the hypothesis tests. The parameter 
estimates of our beef checkoff model are compared with those of Ward and Lambert to see 
how closely we replicate their results. Note that only the checkoff expenditures used by Ward 
and Lambert are available to us. The feeder steer ratio is computed from 1990 revised cattle 
slaughter data available in the USDA agricultural marketing service weekly publication. The 
other data are from Brester and Schroeder's study. A confirmation study can be conducted 
by fitting the original model to original data or "to revised data for the same sample period 
or to data for a new sample period" (Tomek p. 7). 
Although estimating Ward and Lambert's model using OLS leads to biased standard 
errors, the model is still subjected to misspecification testing. McGuirk et al. 's (1993) 
approach to misspecification testing in single linear regression models are used. 
For the Rotterdam model, the following modeling approach is used. The linear 
Rotterdam model is considered with the "other consumption goods" equation included. This 
demand system is subjected to misspecification testing. If the model is misspecified, efforts 
are made to respecificy it. If it cannot be correctly respecified, an alternative linear Rotterdam 
model is considered. The misspecification testing process is repeated until a correctly 
specified model is found. The misspecification tests used here are those proposed by 
McGuirk et al. (1995) for system of linear equations. Note that these tests are different from 
the single-equation misspecification tests. These tests are well described in McGuirk et al. 
(1995). They are conducted using the SAS/IML software. 
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The correctly specified Rotterdam model is estimated using the PROC SYSLIN 
procedure in SAS/ETS. As in Brester and Schroeder, the price symmetry and homogeneity 
conditions are imposed. Since branded advertising for beef, pork, and poultry are included 
in the model, advertising homogeneity is imposed for these variables (see Kinnucan et al.). 
Advertising homogeneity is not imposed for the generic advertising variables since poultry 
advertising is branded advertising. 
Results 
Different Data 
Ward and Lambert's Model. The parameter estimates of the beef model are reported in table 
1 for each type of advertising data. For the checkoff expenditures, the parameter estimates 
of the quantity and income variables are similar to those of Ward and Lambert. The 
parameter estimates of the checkoff variable are different. These parameter estimates suggest 
an even larger effect of checkoff expenditures than was found by Ward and Lambert. This 
fragility in results is probably due to the fact that the feeder steer ratio used here may not be 
the same as the one used by Ward and Lambert. 
The results in table 1 show that the maximum percentage impacts that beef advertising 
can have on prices is 5.1% with the checkoff data and 0.502% with the generic advertising 
data, suggesting that different data lead to different conclusions about advertising 
effectiveness. As discussed in the procedures section, this difference may simply be due to 
the way zero advertising expenditures are treated in this model (see also figure 3). 
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The misspecification test results are reported in table 2. Models 1 and 2 are Ward 
and Lambert's beef models for the checkoff and generic advertising data, respectively. These 
models are estimated using the 1979:2-1991 :2 sample period. Models 3 and 4 are the same 
as 1 and 2 except that the 1970:1-1993:4 sample period is used. Model 5 is the Ward and 
Lambert's pork model. For this model, the 1970:1-1991:4 sample period is used. 
The functional form of the beef model estimated using the checkoff expenditures 
data (Model 1) is misspecified. The Beef model estimated using the generic advertising 
expenditures data (Model 2) is not misspecified. For the 1970:1-1993:4 data, the beef 
models (Models 3 and 4) are all misspecified. The p-values indicate that the dynamic 
homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation assumptions are rejected at the 5 % significance 
level for Model 3. The assumptions of functional form, dynamic homoskedasticity, 
parameter stability, and no autocorrelation do not hold for Model 4. For the pork model, 
the functional form and no autocorrelation assumptions do not hold. 
Models 6 to 10 are the same models as above except that women labor force 
participation and the cholesterol information index are included (these variables are defined 
below in more details). Model 6 is correctly specified. For Models 8, 9, and 10, the 
individual and joint tests indicate that only the assumption of no autocorrelation does not 
hold. 6 Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of the respecified Ward and Lambert's beef 
model when the checkoff expenditures data and the 1979:2-1991:2 sample period are used. 
6Model 7 is of no interest here. It is used only for illustration purposes. Recall 
that Model 2 was not misspecified. 
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The Rotterdam Model. The misspecification test results of the Rotterdam model including 
the other-good equation are reported in tables 4 and 5. All figures reported are p-values. 
Model 1 includes only the variables used by Brester and Schroeder. The full-system joint test 
results show that both the conditional mean and variance of this model are misspecified. This 
misspecification is confirmed by the individual equation-by-equation system tests. There are 
problems with all of the underlying assumptions of the model, except dynamic 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Model 1 is respecified by including women labor force participation and cholesterol 
information index as additional explanatory variables (Model 2). It has been argued that the 
increased participation of women in the labor force may have caused structural change in 
meat demand (McGuirk et al., 1995). Health information has also been found to be a 
significant factor in explaining structural change in meat demand in the United States 
(McGuirk et aL, 1995). The women labor force participation variable used here is different 
from the one used by McGuirk et al. (1995). Here, this variable is the ratio of civilian women 
in the labor force who are married or who maintain a family to the total civil labor force. 
These data were obtained from the World Wide Web site of the Bureau of Labor Statistic. 
Contrary to the ratio used in previous studies, the one used here is not highly correlated with 
a linear time trend (the correlation here is 0.57 compared to the 0.98 of past studies). The 
cholesterol information index used here is the same as the one used by Kinnucan et al. These 
data were requested and obtained from Kinnucan. 
The test results show that Model 2 is also misspecified. The problems are similar to 
the one ofModel 1. An alternative linear Rotterdam model is considered. This model simply 
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does not include the "other goods" equation. A similar model specification was used by 
Kinnucan et al. Kinnucan et al., however, do not include branded advertising in their model 
although they recognize that this may lead to an upward bias in the parameter estimates. 
The misspecification tests are carried out on the alternative Rotterdam model as 
above. Table 6 and 7 report the test results. Model 3 does not include women labor force 
participation and the cholesterol information index variables. The p-values of the full-system 
joint tests indicate that the conditional mean and variance are misspecified. The equation-by-
equation system tests indicate that the. problems may be due to dynamic heteroskedasticity, 
parameter stability, and/or functional fonn. Model 4 includes women labor force participation 
and the cholesterol infonnation index. The p-values of the tests show that all of the 
assumption hold, except maybe the assumption of parameter stability for the mean and 
variance equations. The equation-by-equation tests, however, indicate that the parameters 
of the mean equation are stable. Only the variance-covariance may not be stable. McGuirk 
et al. (1995) indicated that the full-system test can point to a misspecification problem simply 
because the variance-covariance is often inflated with those tests, or because the "cross-
equation residual covariances may not be stable" (p. 15). In the present case, an alternative 
explanation of unstable variance-covariances is that the advertising parameters may vary 
randomly over time. 
Model 5 is estimated with both checkoff and generic advertising expenditures. The 
results are reported in tables 8 and 9 for the 1970:1-1993:4 and 1979:2-1991:2 sample 
periods, respectively. In each case, most of the parameter estimates of the economic variables 
are significantly different from zero. The parameter estimate of the women labor force 
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participation and cholesterol information index variables are also generally significant. 
The advertising elasticities are reported in table 10. The advertising elasticities 
reported here are lower than those obtained by Brester and Schroeder. They are generally 
similar to those calculated by Kinnucan et al. 
The advertising elasticities differ depending on the measure of advertising 
expenditures. To see why this might be the case, the first differences of the logarithm of these 
two data series are plotted in figure 4. This figure shows that there is an outlying observation 
in the checkoff expenditures as discussed earlier. This might cause substantial differences in 
the estimation results. 
Different Functional Forms 
The parameter estimates of the quantity-dependent single-demand models are reported in 
table 11. The beef advertising elasticities are O. 002 and O.0001 for the checkoff and generic 
advertising data, respectively. The pork advertising elasticity is O.0001. For the Rotterdam 
model, the beef checkoff and generic advertising elasticities are 0.000272 and 0.000011. The 
pork advertising elasticity is negative with the checkoff data and zero with the generic 
advertising data. These results indicate that the effects of advertising obtained from the two 
functional forms are different. 
To determine if advertising is a good investment, marginal returns to advertising can 
be calculated as p aq, where p, q, and A are the price, quantity, and advertising 
aA 
expenditures of the good of interest (Piggot et al.). Marginal returns greater than one indicate 
advertising is a good investment (Piggot et al.). Here, p aq is approximated as p t:.q. The 
aA t:.A 
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marginal returns are calculated at the mean of the data. For beef, the marginal returns to 
generic advertising are $2.29 and $0.73 with the 1970-1993 and 1979:2-1991:2 data, 
respectively. Similarly, the marginal returns to pork advertising are $33.74 and nearly zero 
dollars. These results indicate that advertising may have been profitable over the 197 0-1993 
period. 
Different Sample Periods 
The advertising elasticities of the Rotterdam model indicate that the effects of generic 
advertising on meat demand are sensitive to the sample period used. The parameter estimates 
of Ward and Lambert's price dependent model are reported in table 12 for the 1970: 1-1993:4 
sample period. For beef, the maximum effects that advertising can have on prices are 0.078% 
and-0.011% with the checkoff and generic advertising data, respectively. The results for the 
1979:2-1991:2 sample period were 5.1 % and 0.502%. These results also show that different 
sample periods lead to different generic meat advertising effects. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Kinnucan et al. 
Summary and Implications 
United States producer organizations spent about 190 million dollars on beef checkoff 
programs over the 1987-1993 period. Expenditures on generic beef and pork advertising 
exceeded 200 and 70 million dollars over the 1970-1993 period, respectively. The advertising 
programs are designed to stimulate consumers' demand for beef and pork. Producers need 
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to know if the money allocated to generic advertising is a good investment. Past research has 
disagreed about the effectiveness of generic advertising. While some studies report that 
generic advertising effectively increases meat demand, other studies find that generic 
advertising has no substantial effect on meat demand. If advertising is not effective then the 
money should be spent elsewhere. 
Past studies have used different functional forms, different data on advertising, 
different observation periods, and different variables. Two models ( a single-equation model 
like that used by Ward and Lambert and a Rotterdam model like that used by Brester and 
Schroeder and Kinnucan et al.) are used to determine why past studies have reached different 
conclusions about the effectiveness of generic advertising. The primary factor causing the 
differing conclusions was Ward and Lambert's highly unconventional transformation of the 
advertising variable. Every model estimated without this transformation yielded low 
advertising elasticities. When more recent data were used with the Ward and Lambert's 
specification, the estimated effects of beef advertising turned negative. Furthermore, Ward 
and Lambert's transformation yielded very different conclusions with Brester and Schroeder's 
data. With Ward and Lambert's data, their variable was essentially a dummy variable. Slight 
differences in Brester and Schroeder's data caused the conclusions to be totally changed. 
Given the :fragility of Ward and Lambert's results, their model does not seem appropriate. 
Ward and Lambert's and Brester and Schroeder's models were both misspecified. They were 
both made correctly specified by adding additional variables, however the correctly specified 
models did not yield materially different conclusions. 
The generic advertising elasticities estimated from the Rotterdam model are generally 
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very small. Similar results were obtained by Brester and Schroeder and Kinnucan et al. 
These advertising elasticity estimates suggest that advertising does not play a major role in 
meat consumption behavior (Kinnucan et al.; Brester and Schroeder). Results show that, 
besides prices and meat expenditures, health information and the participation of women in 
the labor force play a very important role in meat consumption behavior. The results with the 
Rotterdam model are not fragile. 
The findings of this paper have important implications. Since there is now some 
evidence that generic meat advertising does not have a substantial effect on demand, industry 
groups should tightly monitor and perhaps reduce the money they allocate to generic 
advertising. Time series models like those considered are always subject to the criticism that 
advertising may be positively correlated with some omitted factor which has reduced meat 
demand. One way around such a criticism is to use designed experiments. The one such 
study available by Jensen and Schroeter used split-cable data and also found little effect of 
advertising on beef demand. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the millions spent on 
generic advertising of beef and pork have done little to increase demand. 
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Table 1. Parameter Estimates of the Ward Model For Beef, 1979:2-1991:2 Data 
Checkoff Expenditures 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant 8.0206* 
lnQk -0.0708 
lnQb -0.8066* 
lnQC -0.2558 
lnl 0.2874 
Tl -0.0049 
T2 0.0187* 
Current Advertising 0.0210 
Lag Advertising 0.0718 
Sl -0.0509* 
S2 -0.0193 
S3 0.0063 
FR 0.0119 
R-Square 0.97 
R-Square Adjusted 0.96 
t-Ratio 
3.1250 
-0.8005 
-5.0250 
-1.3320 
0.6076 
-0.4736 
3.8070 
0.5567 
1.7770 
-1.9250 
-1.0790 
0.3575 
1.7580 
Generic Adv. Expenditures 
Coefficient 
7.6785* 
0.0181 
-0.9370* 
-0.0622 
0.2124 
-0.0023 
0.0137* 
-0.0335 
0.0072 
-0.0277 
-0.0012 
0.0351 * 
0.0188* 
0.96 
0.95 
t-Ratio 
2.7110 
0.2063 
-5.3770 
-0.3074 
0.3981 
-0.2013 
2.6450 
-1.1570 
0.2409 
-0.9833 
-0.0608 
2.0700 
2.7300 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote significant at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2. P-Values of the Misspecification Tests, Ward and Lambert's Models 
Model 
Assumptions Test 1 2 3 4 5 
Individual Tests 
Normality Skewness 0.300 0.995 0.634 0.593 0.845 
Kurtosis 0.703 0.415 0.639 0.554 0.749 
Functional Form RESET2 0.050 0.084 0.001 0.001 0.005 
Static Homoskedasticity RESET2 0.953 0.471 0.033 0.044 0.000 
Dynamic Homoskedasticity ARCHl 0.459 0.190 0.003 0.002 0.000 
Parameter Stability 0.000 0.000 0.009 
Independence 0.191 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-------------------------------------------
Joint Tests 
Conditional Mean Overall F-test 0.088 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parameter Stability Parameter Shifts 0.182 0.196 0.981 
Functional Form RESET 2 0.077 0.150 0.118 0.056 0.023 
Independence 0.333 0.306 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Conditional Variance Overall F-test 0.108 0.258 0.031 0.042 0.441 
Parameter Stability Variance Shifts 0.094 0.211 0.127 
Static Homoskedasticity RESET2 0.144 0.683 0.291 0.749 0.594 
Dynamic Homoskedasticity ARCHl 0.102 0.109 0.042 0.024 0.603 
Note: Models 1 and 2 are Ward and Lambert's beef models for the checkoff and generic 
advertising data, respectively, 1979:2-1991:2 sample period. Models 3 and 4 are the 
same as land 2 except that the 1970: 1-1993 :4 sample period is used. Model 5 is the 
Ward and Lambert's pork model. For this model, the 1970:1~1991:4 sample size is 
used. 
The parameter stability test is conducted using a dummy variable. The Chow and 
CUSUMSQ tests were not reliable when the beef model and the 1979:2-1991:2 
sample were used. Also in this case, the parameter stability test cannot be conducted 
using a time trend or a dummy variable because of the use ofT1 and T2 inthe model. 
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Table 2. Continued 
Model 
Assumptions Test 6 7 8 9 10 
Individual Tests 
Normality Skewness 0.199 0.887 0.968 0.819 0.601 
Kurtosis 0.818 0.436 0.910 0.503 0.251 
Functional Form RESET 2 0.121 0.268 0.495 0.408 0.405 
Static Homoskedasticity . RESET2 0.336 0.106 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Dynamic Homoskedasticity ARCHl 0.822 0.091 0.011 0.006 0.000 
Parameter Stability 0.102 0.170 0.475 
Independence 0.757 0.617 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-------------------------------------------
Joint Tests 
Conditional Mean Overall F-test 0.269 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Parameter Stability Parameter Shifts 0.095 0.086 0.371 
Functional Form RESET2 0.114 0.257 0.274 0.135 0.023 
Independence 0.869 0.794 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Conditional Variance Overall F-test 0.369 0.137 0.210 0.326 0.292 
Parameter Stability Variance Shifts 0.390 0.827 0.367 
Static Homoskedasticity RESET2 0.299 0.402 0.213 0.459 0.222 
Dynamic Homoskedasticity ARCHl 0.236 0.051 0.201 0.097 0.314 
Note: Models 6 and 7 are Ward and Lambert's beef models for the checkoff and generic 
advertising data, respectively, 1979:2-1991:2 sample period. Models 8 and 9 are the 
same as 1 and 2 except that the 1970: 1-1993: 4 sample period is used. Model 10 is 
the Ward and Lambert's porkmodel. For this model, the 1970:1-1991:4 sample size 
is used. 
The parameter stability test is conducted using a dummy variable. The Chow and 
CUSUMSQ tests were not reliable when the beef model and the 1979:2-1991:2 
sample were used. Also in this case, the parameter stability test cannot be conducted 
using a time trend or a dummy variable because of the use of T 1 and T 2 in the model. 
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Table 3. Parameter Estimates of the Correctly Specified Ward and Lambert's Model 
for Beef, Checkoff Expenditures Data, 1972:2-1991:2 
Variable Coefficient t-Ratio 
Constant 16.863* 4.741 
lnQk -0.095 -1.166 
lnQb. -0.755* -5.253 
lnQC -0.053 -0.285 
lnl 0.197 . 0.422 
Tl 0.009 0.639 
T2 0.008** 1.577 
Advertising 0.055 1.509 
Lag Advertising 0.048 1.319 
Sl -0.016 -0.610 
S2 0.003 0.145 
S3 0.015 0.904 
FR 0.004 0.537 
lnWLFP -2.307* -2.876 
lnCHOL -0.384 -1.255 
R-Square 0.98 
R-Square Adjusted 0.97 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote significant at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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.Table 4. P-values of the Misspecification Tests for the Beef, Pork, Poultry, and Other 
Goods Equations, Full System Tests, 1970:1-1993:4 
Item 
Individual Tests 
Normality 
Skewness 
· Kurtosis 
Functional Form 
RESET2 
Heteroskedasticity 
Static: RESET. 
Dynamic 
· Autocorrelation 
Parameter Stability 
Varfance 
Mean 
Joint Tests 
Overall Mean Test 
Parameter Stability 
Functional Form 
Autocorrelation 
Overall Variance Test 
Parameter· Stability 
Static Heteroskedasticity 
Dynamic· Heteroskedasticity 
.Model 1 
0.0008 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0006 
0.9455 
0.3256 
0;0000 
0.0240 
0.0035 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1313 
0.3411 
0.003.9 
0.9996 
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Model2 
0.0007 .. 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.9914. 
0.4103 
0.0000 
0.0054 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0408 
0.3237 
0.0001 
0.9971 
Table 5. P-values of the Misspecification Tests for the Beef, Pork, Poultry, and Other 
Goods Equations, Equation-by-Equation System Tests, 1970:1-1993:4 
Model 1 Model2 
Beef Pork Poultry Other Beef Pork Poultry Other 
Individual Tests 
Normality 
Skewness 0.0225 0.0048 0.1456 0.0072 0.0206 0.0029 0.0226 0.0110 
Kurtosis 0.0311 0.0009 0.0562 0.0034 0.1511 0.0001 0.0038 0.0449 
Functional Form 
RESET 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0279 0.0000 0.0407 
Heteroskedasticity 
Static Beef 0.0162 0.1867 0.6138 0.0430 0.0020 0.0004 0.3647 0.2857 
RESET2 Pork 0.1056 0.1345 0.0288 0.2321 0.0022 0.2461 
Poultry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0045 
Other 0.0000 0.0000_, 
Dynamic Beef 0.7311 0.9973 0.8515 0.0995 0.8891 0.9768 0.6274 0.7615 
Pork 0.9736 0.7256 0.0067 0.9334 0.4425 0.1207 
Poultry 0.1519 · 0.0007 0.5878 0.0628 
Other 0.0311 0.0760 
Autocorrelation 0.6644 0.2320 0.5159 0.1913 0.6509 0.5226 0.4439 0.1650 
Parameter Stability 
Variance 0.0230 0.9303 0.9660 0.5271 0.0380 0.9842 0.9937 0.3542 
Mean 0.2101 0.4656 0.0054 0.9927 0.4057 0.4264 0.0013 0.9988 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Tests 
Overall Mean Test 0.0012 0.0193 0.0038 0.2498 0.0009 0.0805 0.0000 0.1794 
Parameter Stability 0.5421 0.7093 0.8124 0.6735 0.9536 0.8381 0.7596 0.9465 
Functional Form 0.0019 0.0236 0.0013 0.4930 0.0000 0.0251 0.0000 0.2063 
Autocorrelation 0.7448 0.5498 0.6310 0.1931 0.4535 0.1392 0.2649 0.2177 
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Table 5. Continued 
Overall Variance Test 
Beef 0.0044 0.0578 0.2233 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009 0.0210 0.0000 
Pork 0.0592 0.0966 0.0053 0.0909 0.8029 0.0442 
Poultry 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0442 
Other 0.0000 0.5324 
Parameter Stability 
Beef 0.1214 0.5222 0.3562 0.1792 0.3838 0.2782 0.5769 0.4359 
Pork 0.3362 0.6551 0.5595 0.1332 0.8060 0.8925 
Poultry 0.9217 0.4474 0.2363 0.2954 
Other 0.9219 0.4680 
Static Heteroskedasticity 
Beef 0.0042 0.0256 0.1249 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 0.0116 0.0000 
Pork 0.0157 0.2289 0.0904 0.0556 0.5804 0.1622 
Poultry 0.0006 0.0015 0.0000 0.1170 
Other 0.3547 0.2281 
Dynamic Heteroskedasticity 
Beef 0.9743 0.5955 0.7902 0.0398 0.9744 0.2549 0.7745 0.0288 
Pork 0.9869 0.3680 0.0840 0.8811 0.9421 0.4433 
Poultry 0.8423 0.0059 0.7416 0.5769 
Other 1.0000 0;9909 
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Table 6. P-values of the Misspecification Tests for the Beef, Pork, a.nd Poultry 
Equations, Full System Tests, 1970:1-1993:4 
Item 
Individual Tests 
Normality 
Skewness. 
Kurtosis 
Functional Form 
RESET2 
Heteroskedasticity 
Static: RESET 
Dynamic 
Autocorrelation 
Parameter Stability 
Variance 
Mean 
.. Model 3 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0014 
0.1005 
0.0264 
0.0046 
0.0000 
0.0006 
Model4 
0.1865 
0.0000 
0.18461 
0.4325 . 
0.7538 
0.5965 
0.0000 
0.0029 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- .-----
Joint Tests 
Overall Mean Test 
Parameter Stability 
Functional Form. 
Autocorrelation 
Overall Variance Test · 
Parameter Stability 
Static Heteroskedasticity 
Dynamic Heteroskedasticity 
0.0001 
0.1192 
0.0006 
0.0114 
0.0000 
0.3491 
···0.0291 
0.0039 
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0.4195 
· 0.8050 
0.1492 
0.5152 
0.0147 
0.3172 
0.1524 
0.7537 
Table 7. P-values of the Misspecification Tests for the Beef, Pork, and Poultry 
. Equations, Equation-by-Equation System Tests, 1970: 1-1993:4 
Model3 Model 4 
Beef Pork Poultry Beff Pork Poultry 
Individual Tests 
Normality 
Skewness 0.7194 0.0625 0.6692 0.1967 0.0762 0.1274 
Kurtosis 0.3801 0.7873 0.6889. 0.8070 0.2775 0.9172 
Functional Form· 
RESET2 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.4284 0.0541 0.2284 
Heteroskedasticity 
Static Beef 0.8395 0.8104 0.6281 0.8729 0.5794 0.9054 
RESET2 Pork 0.5659 0.6578 0.0381 0.7180 
Poultry 0.3385 0.8629 
Dynamic Beef 0.0532 0.3944 0.0367 0.1735 0.5000 0.2947 
Pork 0.6493 0.2459 0.7064 0.3824 
Poultry 0.0512 0.7685 
Autocorrelation 0.4581 0.2260 0.1598 0.6788 0.8349 0.1121 
Parameter Stability 
Variance 0.9097 0.2821 0.9985 0.9845 0.7771 0.8058 
Mean 0.0163 0.0266 0.0128 0.1057 0.0042 0.5169 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Tests 
Overall Mean Test 0.0000 0.0192 0.0000 0.6462 0.5658 0.1609 
Parameter Stability 0.9630 0.5466 0.7092 0.5909 0.3768 0.6586 
Functional Form 0.0000 0.0228 0.0000 0.3171 0.2051 0.2686 
Autocorrelation 0.4581 0.2260 0.1598 0.6442 0.5275 0.1373 
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Table 7. Continued 
Overall Variance Test 
Beef 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0282 
Pork 0.0017 0.0315 0.0000 0.5315 
Poultry 0.0000 0.0015 
Parameter Stability 
· Beef 0.1214 0.2184 0.3022 0.3493 0.2122 0.8860 
Pork 0.2584 0.6615 0.4935 0.1720 
Poultry 0.4257 0.2012 
Static Heteroskedasticity 
Beef· . . 0.2932 0.33.89 ·. 0.2873 0.1098 0.0039 0:9393 
Pork 0.3485. 0.4554 0.0002 0.8071 
Poultry 0.1639 0.1170 
•"' 
Dynamic Heteroskedasticity · 
Beef 0.0118 0.3100 0.0063 0.0953 0.6137 0.0734 
Pork ..... 0.5333 0.2376 0.9626 0.4897 
Poultry 0.0052 0.2577 
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Table 8. Parameter Estimates of the Rotterdam Model for Beef, Pork, and Poultry, 
1970:1-1993:4 
Checkoff Expenditures Generic Advertising Expenditures 
Independent 
Variable QBEEF QPORK QPOULTRY QBEEF QPORK QPOULTRY 
Prices: 
Beef -0.188868* -0.179816* 
(-9.611) (-9.580) 
Pork 0.195048* -0.132642* 0.191956* -0.137951* 
(12.291) (-8.408) (12.902) (-9.261) 
Poultry -0.006180 -0.062406* 0.068586 -0.012140 -0.054005* 0.066145 
(-0.659) (-7.800) (-1.280) (-6.787) 
Expenditures 0.236903* 0.082030* 0.681067 0.239316* 0.078869* 0.681815 
(17.048) (6.886) (18.196) (7.131) 
Cholesterol 
Index -0.001965** 0.000842 0.001251 -0.003295* 0.001159 -0.002136 
(-1.558) (0.780) (-2.785) (1.168) 
Women Labor 
Force 0.005832* -0.005243* -0.000589 0.007891 * -0.005598* -0.002293 
(2.415) (-2.536) (3.462) (-2.925) 
Generic Adv.: 
Beef 0.000041* 0.000004 -0.000045 0.000018* -0.000004 -0.000014 
(2.179) (0.221) (2.122) (-0.514) 
Pork -0.000009 -0.000019 0.000028 -0.000033 0.000002 0.000031 
(-0.303) (-0.744) (-0.860) (0.062) 
Lag Gen. Adv.: 
Beefl -0.000016** 0.000003 0.000013 -0.000009** 0.000011* -0.000002 
(-1.521) (0.388) (-1.537) (2.446) 
Beef2 0.000013 -0.000001 -0.000012 -0.000019* -0.000001 0.000020 
(1.221) (-0.161) (-3.209) (-0.358) 
Beef3 -0.000027* 0.00001 0.000026 0.000022* -0.000017* -0.000005 
(-2.601) (1.109) (4.016) (-3.556) 
Pork 1 -0.000009 0.000018 -0.000009 0.000005 -0.000021 0.000016 
(-0.441) (0.985) (0.163) (-0.828) 
Pork2 0.000031 -0.000008 -0.000023 0.001210· -0.000004 -0.001206 
(1.468) (-0.425) (4.033) (-0.174) 
Pork3 0.000025 -0.000008 -0.000017 -0.000077. 0.000064. 0.000013 
(1.209) (-0.418) (-2.582) (2.578) 
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Table 8. Continued 
Branded Adv. 
Beef 0.000026 0.000028 -0.000054 -0.000082 . 0.000019 0.000063 
(0.397) (0.508) ( .. 1.418) (0.382) 
Pork -0.000015 -0.000024 0.000039 0.000071 -0.000014 -0.000057 
(-0.243) (-0.156) (1.275) (-0.294) 
Poultry -0.000011 ** ~0.000004 0.000015 0.000011* -0.000005 -0.000006 
(-1.592) (-0.728) (1.988) (-1.033) . 
· Seasonality 
D2 -0:001328 0.003617* -0.002289 -0.001046 0.003217* -0.002171 
(-0.624) (1.988) (-0.514) (1.886) 
D3 0.004365*· 0.014967* :..0.019332 0.006391* 0.013220* -0.019611 
(1.842) · (7.311) (2.806) (6.825) 
D4 -0.028902* 0.031807* -0.002905 -0.026657* 0.030920* -0.004263 
(-12 .. 405) (15.728) (,-11.975) (16.262) 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
The parameter estimates of the poultry equation are calculated from the adding-up 
condition. · 
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Table 9. Parameter Estimates of the Rotterdam Model for '.Beef, Pork, and Poultry, 
1979:2-1991:2 
Checkoff Expenditures Generic Advertising Expenditures 
lnd(?pendent 
Vanable QBEEF QPORK QPOULTRY QBEEF QPORK QPOULTRY 
· Prices: 
Beef 
Pork. 
Po:ultry 
Expenditures 
Cholesterol 
-0.289173* 
(-8.566) 
0.114072* -0.085168* 
(4.409) (-3.556). 
0.175101 * -0.028904* 
(11.062) . (-2.369} 
0.304043* 0.132128* 
(12.210) {6.528) 
Index . -0.001478 0.003095 
(-0.417) (1.057) 
Women Labor· 
-0.146197 
0.563829 
· -0.001617 
-0.278497* 
(-7.761) 
0.103006* 
(3.905) 
0.175492* 
(10.520) 
0.302271* 
{11.410) 
-0.001694 
(-0.458) 
-0.080627* 
(-3.475) 
-0.022379* -0.153113 
{-1.863) 
0.134949* 0.562780 
· (6.603) 
0.003489 -0.001795 
(1.205) 
Force · 0.005340 -0.010115** 0.004775 0.005809 -0.010864* 0.005055 
(0.772) (-1.772) (0.807) (-1.931) 
Generic Adv.: 
Beef 0.000123* -0.000024 -0.000099 0.000030 -0.000001 -0.000029 
{2;911) (,-0.701) (1.392) (-0.073) 
Pork -0.000110** -0.000027 0.000137 -0.000070 -0.000053 0.000123 
(-1.848) (-0.554) (-0.820) (-0.807) 
Lag Gen. Adv.: 
Beefl 0.000015 0.000002 -0.000017 -0.000013* -0.000004 0.000017 
(1.599) (0.282) . (-1.999) .. (-0.742) 
. Beef2 .. 0.000041* ;.0.000007 -0.000034 -0.000029* 0.000006 -0.000023 
(4.111) (-0.873). (-4.660) (1.274) 
Beef3 ".'0.000024"' 0.000024* 0.000000 · 0.000018* -0.000015* -0.000003 
(-2.448) ·-(2.998) (2.928) (-3.044) 
Pork 1 -0.000052* 0.000033* -0.000019 0.000009 0.000050* -0.000059 
(-3:oi8) .. (2.374) (0.293) (2.085). 
Pork2 -0.000025 -0.000015 -0.000040 0.000122* -0.000047* -0.000075 
(-1.451) (-1.070) {3.888) (-1.941) 
Pork3 0.000030** -0.000029 -0.000001 -0.000065* 0.000050* 0.000015 
(l.734) (-2.008) (-2.030) (1.990) 
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Table 9. Continued 
Branded Adv. 
Beef 0.000181 . 0.000054 -0.000235 -0.000169* 0.000112* 0.000057 
(1.549) (0.510) (-2.480) (2.113) 
Pork -0.000151 -0.000059 0.000210 0.000145 -0.000109* -0.000036 
(-1.451) (-0.690) (2.358) (-2.280) 
Poultry -0.000029* ().000044 -0.000015 0.000024* -0.000003 -0.000021 
(-2.126) (0.396) (2.194) (-0.389) 
Seasonality 
D2 -0.002975 0.001716* -0.004741 -0.002096 0.007260* -0.005164 
(-1.010) (3.221) · (-0.715) (3.212) 
D3 -0.001338 0.012760* -0.011455 -0.002166 0.012678* -0.124614 . 
(-0.397) (4.717) (-0.630) (4.830) 
D4 -0.033280* 0.034895* -0 .. 001615 -0.031922* 0.034171* -0.002249 
(-11.467) . (14.711) (-10.805) (14.911) 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote significance at the 5 and 10 percent lev~l, 
respectively. 
The parameter estimates of the poultry equation are calculated from the adding-up 
condition. 
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Table 10. Elasticity Estimates, Rotterdam Model for Beef, Pork, and Poultry 
Checkoff Expenditures Generic Advertising 
Variable Beef Pork Poultry Beef · Pork Poultry 
Prices 
Beef -0:251415 0.768753. ~0.374082 -0.254268 0.753810 -0.335527 
-0.507321 0.422489 1.094381 -0.488591 · 0.381504 1.096825 
Pork .. 0.343985 -0.688568 -0.144993 0.337298 -0.666292 -0.158253 
0.200126, -0.315437 -0.180650 0.180712 ;.0.298619 -0.139869 
Poultry. -0.092569. -0.080186 0.519075 -0.083029 -0.087519 0.493781 
,;.0.307195 -0.107052 ~0.913731 0.307881 -0.082885 -0.956956 
Meat 
Expend. 0.398910 0.294450 4.704849'. 0.403247 0.286894 4.700986 
0.533409 0.489363 3.523931 0.530300 0.499816 3.517375 
Generic Advertising 
Beef 0.000007 0.000106 -0.000219 0.000027 -0.000053 -0.000068 
0.000272 -0.000019 -0.000938 0.000011 -0.000052 -0.000238 
Pork 0.000017 -0.000106 -0.000219 0.001920 0.000205 -0.008130 
-0.000275 · -0.000141 0.000481 ..:0.000001 0.000000 0.000025 
Branded Advertising 
Beef 0.000039 -0.000227 -0.000411 -0.000142 0.000057 0.000473 
. 0.0.00318 0.000200 -0.001469 -0.000296 0.000415 0.000356 
Pork -0.000019 -0.000167 0.000301· 0.000125 -0.000042 -0.000432 
-0.000265 -0.000219 0.001313 0.000254 -0.000404 -0.000225 
Poultry -0;000020 0.000061 0.000110 0.000017 -0.000011 -0.000048 
-0.000051 0.000163 -0.000094 0.000042 -0.000011 -0.000131 
Note: Price and meat .expenditures elasticities are compensated elasticities: For each 
equation, elasticities are calculated as 1:he ratio of the parameter estimates to the 
budget share. For the generic advertising variables, the coefficient ·of the lagged 
. variables are added to those of the contemporaneous variables before calculating the 
ratio. 
The elasticities are for the 1970:1,;.1993:4 and 1979:2-1991:2, respectively. 
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Table 11. Parameter Estimates of the Ward and Lambert Model for Beef and Pork, 
1970:1-1993:4 Data, Quantity Dependent Model 
Beef Checkoff Expenditures Generic Advertising Expenditures 
Beef Pork 
Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio 
Constant 1.268 0.825 0.961 0.638 5.193* 2.661 
lnPb. -0.557* -4.326 -0.506* -5.462 0.375* 3.367 
lnPk 0.075 1.425 0.083** 1.635 -0.723* -12.430 
lnPC -0.010 -0.133 -0.011 -0.153 -0.112 -1.333 
lnl 1.148* 4.002 1.147* 4.205 0.166 0.598 
Tl -0.025* '-4.381 -0.025*· -4.661 -0.002 -0.383 
T2 0.011* 2.405 0.010* 2.743 
Current Adv. -0. 004 -0.081 -0.050 -0.556 0.055 1.591 
Lag Adv. 0.035 0.610 0.142** 1.617 0.037 1.016 
Sl -0.013 -1.527 -0.013** -1.698 -0.064* -7.023 
S2 0.014 1.516 0.017* · 1.962 -0.090* · -9.671 
S3 0.034* 4.411 0.035* 4.730 -0.079* -8.694 
FR 0.003 0.504 0.003 0.478 
R-Square 0.97 0.97 0.95 
R-Square 
Adjusted 0.96 0.96 0.93 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote significant at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 12. Parameter Estimates of the Ward Model for Beef and Pork, 1970:1-1993:4 
Data 
Beef Checkoff Expenditures Generic Advertising Expenditures 
Beef Pork 
Variable Coefficient t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio Coefficient t-Ratio 
Constant 4.0286* 2.1840 3_9559• 2.1840 6.6577* 4.8050 
lnQk -0.3644* -3.3840 -0.3617* -3.2160 -1.1626* -12.0800 
lnQb -1.2457* -7.5690 -1.2228* -7.3770 -0.4453* -3.3090 
lnQC -0.0283 -0.1374 -0.0983 --0.4702 0.0460 0.2453 
lnI 1.4241* 7.9150 1.4741 * 9.2990 0.8077* 5.9630 
Tl -0.0263* -6.0530 -0.0021· -6.9330 -0.0128* -3.7080 
Current Adv. -0.1385** -1.5660 -0.0197 --0.4251 -0.0027 -0.0670 
Lag Adv. 0.1087 1.2160 -0.0156 -0.3329 0.0551 1.3340 
SI · -0:0483 -1.3960 -0.0604** -1.7090 -0.0810* -2.4510 
S2 -0.0356 -1.4070 -0.0461 •• -1.7310 -0.1058* -4.4950 
S3 0.0094 0.4562 0.0421 0.2013 -0.0775* -3.7980 
FR 0.0263 1.4000 0.0264 1.4010 
R-Square 0.98 0.96 0.97 
R-Square 
Adjusted 0.97 0.95 0.97 
Note: Single and double asterisks denote significant at the 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Science degree in Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State University in December 
1994. Completed the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural 
Economics at Oklahoma State University in July 1997. 
Experience:. Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, August 1994-August 1997. 
Employed by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency as a trainee, July-August 
1990, Korhogo, Cote d'Ivoire . 
. Professional Memberships: American Agricultural Economics Association, Western 
Agricultural Economics Association, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, 
Northeastern Agricultural Economics Association, International Society of 
African Scientists .. 
Awards: Gamma Sigma Delta; Spillman Scholarship. 
